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PRE-MACCABEAN DOCUMENTS IN THE PASSOVER HAGGADAH

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(CONCLUDED)

III. THE COMPOSITION, DAYYENU (D)

THE composition dayyenu as preserved in the extant rituals consists of two parts — the first a poem in fifteen strophes (Da), the second a prose summary (Db). It reads as follows: [98]

D

How many are the calls of the Almighty upon our thankfulness!

Da

Ia Had He brought us out of Egypt,
And not executed judgment on them
It had sufficed us!

b Had He executed judgment on them,
But not wrought justice on their gods
It had sufficed us!

c Had He wrought justice on their gods,
And not slain their first-born
It had sufficed us!

d Had He slain their first-born,
And not given us their substance
It had sufficed us!

e Had He given us their substance,
And not cleft us the sea
It had sufficed us!

[98] The translation (altered in accordance with the changes suggested by considerations to be presented in the notes immediately following) is that of Cecil Roth (see his ed. and tr. of the Passover Haggadah, London, 1934).

IIa Had He cleft us the sea,
And not brought us through it dryshod
It had sufficed us!

b Had He brought us through it dryshod,
And not sunk our oppressors in its depths
It had sufficed us!

c Had He sunk our oppressors in its depths,
And not satisfied our wants in the wilderness for forty years
It had sufficed us!

d Had He satisfied our wants in the wilderness for forty years,
And not fed us with the manna
It had sufficed us!

e Had He fed us with the manna,
And not given us the Sabbath
It had sufficed us!

IIIa Had He given us the Sabbath,
And not brought us to the Mount of Sinai
It had sufficed us!

b Had He brought us to the Mount of Sinai,
And not given us the Law
It had sufficed us!

c Had He given us the Law,
And not brought us into the Land of Israel
It had sufficed us!

d Had He brought us into the Land of Israel,
And not built us the Chosen Temple
It had sufficed us!

e [Had He built us the Chosen Temple,
And not appointed a High Priest for us
It had sufficed us!] [99]

Db

How much more so, then, hath the Almighty a double, and redoubled, call upon our thankfulness! For He brought us out of Egypt, and executed judgment on them, and wrought justice on their gods, and slew their first-born, and gave us their substance, and cleft us the sea, and brought us through it dry-shod, and sank our oppressors in its depths, and satisfied our wants in the wilderness for forty years, and fed us with the manna, and gave us the Sabbath, and brought us to the Mount of Sinai, and gave us the Law, and brought us into the land of Israel and built us the chosen Temple, [and appointed a High Priest for us] [100] to atone for all our sins.[101]

[99] For this addition to the usual text, see Additional Note F.

[100] For the correct reading of this passage see Additional Note F.

[101] D is omitted from the Passover Haggadah in the ritual prepared by Maimonides.

The date of this work must be earlier than the time of Rab (middle of the third century of the Christian Era), who refers to it. In commenting on Malachi 3. 10: "If I will not open you the windows of heaven, and pour you out a blessing, *that there shall be more than sufficiency*" (*'ad beli dai*), Rab said, the verse means, "Until your lips shall weary from saying, 'it is sufficient'" (*milomar dai*).[102] Clearly, he has in mind the custom of saying *dayyenu* ("It is sufficient") in the Passover service; and predicted that in the future redemption it will be said not fifteen times, but so many times, as to weary the lips.

A tannaitic source, possibly a generation or more older than Rab, likewise indicates an acquaintance with D. Sifre Deuteronomy thrice (sections 9, Fr. 67a, Fi. 17; 337, Fr. 141a, Fi. 387; 339, Fr. 141a, Fi. 338) describes Moses as the "man who brought us forth from Egypt, and sundered the sea for us, and brought us down the manna, and brought us down the quails, and performed miracles and heroic deeds for us." It is apparent that the author of this passage was acquainted with D. Indeed the author's description of Moses is probably intended as a protest against the failure of D to mention the first and greatest of the prophets.

But, as in the case of A, B, and M, it can be demonstrated that D is much more ancient than the third century of the Christian Era.

The poetical portion of D, it is important to note, consists (as indicated in the translation above) of three divisions. The first division is devoted to the mercies shown Israel while in Egypt; the second to those shown Israel during the wandering from Egypt to the Holy Land; the third, to the spiritual goods bestowed on Israel.

The reference to the high priest shows that the work antedates the destruction of the Temple. But even if the text containing that reference be rejected as spurious, it is certain that only a person living during the time of the sanctuary would

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In that of R. Saadia, it is described as a passage which may be recited, but which is not part of the regular service (see I. Davidson, S. Assaf, B. I. Joel, Siddur R. Saadja Gaon, p. 143).

[102] B. Shabbat 32b; see M. Friedmann, Meir Ayyin, 1895, p. 106.

think of its establishment as the climax of Jewish history; and could fail to refer to it without the customary addition (inserted, indeed, in some rituals) "may it speedily be restored."

The year 70 of the Christian Era is therefore the *terminus ad quem* for this poem. The *terminus a quo* is the year 198 B.C., when Palestine was finally occupied by the Seleucids. The fierce vindictiveness against the Egyptians displayed in the poem contrasts sharply with the manifest Egyptophilism of A and M; and could not have been introduced, or permitted to persist, in a poem recited at the Passover celebration, under the Ptolemaic rule.

Careful analysis enables us to fix the date within more definite limits. D is obviously profoundly influenced by the prayer in Nehemiah 9. 6 ff., as can be seen by comparing the lists of miracles in the two works. Thus, Nehemiah 9. 10 ff. reads: "And Thou didst show signs and wonders upon Pharaoh, and on all his servants, and on all the people of his land . . . (11) and Thou didst divide the sea before them, so that they went through the midst of the sea on the dry land; and their pursuers Thou didst cast into the depths like a stone into the mighty waters . . . (13) Thou camest down also upon Mount Sinai, and spokest with them from heaven, and gavest them right ordinances and laws of truth, good statutes and commandments; (14) and madest known to them Thy holy sabbath, and didst command them commandments, and statutes, and a law, by the hand of Moses Thy servant; (15) and gavest them bread from heaven for their hunger, and broughtest forth water for them out of the rock for their thirst, . . . (20) Thou gavest them also Thy good spirit to instruct them, and withheldest not Thy manna from their mouth and gavest them water for their thirst. (21) Yea, forty years, didst Thou sustain them in the wilderness and they lacked nothing. . . . (22) Moreover Thou gavest them kingdoms and peoples, which Thou didst allot quarter by quarter, so that they possessed the land of Sihon, even the land of the King of Heshbon, and the land of Og, King of Bashan. . . . (24) So the children went in and possessed the land, and Thou didst subdue before them the inhabitants of the land, the Canaanites. . . ."

D also has close relationship with Psalms 135–136, which likewise enumerate the miracles done on behalf of Israel. Yet all of these strongly emphasize the victories of Israel over Sihon and Og, which are unmentioned in D, though the Passover celebration, under an autonomous Jewish government, might seem a particularly appropriate time for referring to these early victories of Israel. The omission of any reference to them, as well as the silence of the poet regarding any military achievements by Israel, seems to indicate a period when the Jews were under the domination of other peoples, and did not dare refer to their early military prowess. The period between 164 and 63 B.C. should therefore be excluded as a possible time for the origin and insertion of this poem in the Passover Haggadah.

Indeed it is quite improbable that D was composed any time after 164 B.C. This follows from the failure of the poet to make any mention of Jerusalem as a holy city. It might have been expected that the five spiritual gifts for which a poet would express thanks to God would be: (*a*) the Sabbath; (*b*) the Torah; (*c*) Palestine; (*d*) Jerusalem; (*e*) the Temple. This poet deliberately omits Jerusalem; though that omission makes it necessary for him to divide the miracle of the Revelation into two parts: the approach to Mount Sinai, and the Giving of the Torah.

The importance of Jerusalem in Judaism was, as indicated above,[103] a subject of controversy during the first part of the second century B.C. At any rate, Ben Sira [104] lays great emphasis on the peculiar sanctity of Jerusalem; whereas the author of Zechariah XII–XIV conceives of a possible eschatological war of Judaea against Jerusalem. Either the son or the grandson of Simeon the Righteous, it must be borne in mind, was actually able to bring himself to establish a Temple at Heliopolis. All these controversies regarding the status of Jerusalem came to an end, however, with the outbreak of the Maccabean war; for that war had for one of its primary purposes freeing the Holy City from Syrian occupation. From that time on, the

[103] See above, Vol. XXXV, pp. 317 f.

[104] Cf. e.g. Ecclus. 36. 17–19.

daily prayers and the blessing after food contained special prayers for Jerusalem.[105] So, too, the various prayers in Daniel lay especial emphasis on Jerusalem. Once gained, this special importance attaching to Jerusalem, as a sacred city, was never lost.[106] The high priestly compiler of D apparently had little feeling for the sanctity of the city. Instead of referring to it as one of the Divine gifts, he preferred to make special mention of the appearance before Mount Sinai. This attitude suggests that he was a pre-Maccabean writer.

The whole tenor of D similarly points to the Hellenistic age as its time of origin. Its spirit is not only un-Rabbinic and un-Pharisaic; it is, in many respects, anti-Rabbinic and anti-Pharisaic. The emphasis on the despoilment of the Egyptians and their sufferings strikes notes alien to the spirit of the Pharisees and the later Rabbinic sages. In the poem no mention is made of Moses or of the dynasty of David. In view of the controversies which surrounded the significance of these men in Jewish history, it is obvious that this omission was deliberate and calculated. Moses is omitted from D for the same reason that he is omitted from M: because the high priestly compilers did not wish to stress the part played in the Exodus by a Levite. Had D been composed after 76 B.C. it would inevitably have become an issue in the controversy between the Pharisees and the Sadducees; and could not have been preserved in the Jewish liturgies. It is obvious from the allusions to D in Rabbinic

[105] Cf. Jewish Quarterly Review, N. S. XVI, 1925, p. 36; XIX, 1929, p. 220. When I wrote the latter article, I still believed that the Book of Jubilees was a product of the latter half of the second century B.C., following in this respect the opinion of R. H. Charles (The Book of Jubilees, 1902, pp. LVIII ff.) and numerous other writers. The belief that the book is really a product of the earlier half of the second century B.C., and is pre-Maccabean, has been supported by E. Meyer, Ursprung u. Anfaenge d. Christentums, II, pp. 45 ff., and W. F. Albright, From the Stone Age to Christianity, pp. 266 ff. A review of the evidence has convinced me that their view is correct. Some of the evidence leading to this conclusion is briefly summarized below, pp. 19 ff.

[106] The curious omission of any reference to Jerusalem or the Holy Temple in the praise of God as the Creator and Deliverer of Israel, in Pss. 135. 3–12 (vv. 1, 2, are obviously an introduction, which is not an integral part of the original psalm; v. 21 is part of the doxology, which is likewise a liturgical addition after the psalm was introduced into the service) and 136. 1–26, may be due to the fact that the essential portions of these psalms were composed during the period of the Maccabean rebellion when the Temple was defiled, and Jerusalem was in the hands of the pagans, so that it would have been blasphemous to mention either as one of God's gifts to Israel.

literature that despite the pointed omission of all mention of it in the Mishna, it was well-known to the Rabbinic sages. Indeed the echoes of it in their casual remarks show that they were in the habit of repeating it frequently. This suggests that D was composed before Pharisaism developed into an organized opposition to the high priesthood, i.e., before the break between the high priesthood and the Pharisees (*ca.* 110 B.C.).

The omissions discussed above show that the date of D cannot possibly be between 167 and 110 B.C.

It follows from this that the poem was composed before 167 B.C.

The conclusion to which these considerations lead us, then, is that D was composed and introduced into the liturgy of the Passover eve during the generation between 198 and 167 B.C. when Palestine was under the rule of the Seleucid government. During the first part of this period Simeon the Righteous served as high priest. In view of the close relations between him and the pre-Pharisaic, Hasidic scribes, it is quite improbable that he was the compiler of this poem. Furthermore, as it is entirely probable that he was the sponsor of the earliest sections of the Passover Haggadah, A and M, it would be strange to find him also responsible for so mundane a work as D.

It is equally improbable that the Egyptophile, Onias II, could have been responsible for so anti-Egyptian a document. We must therefore suppose that D originated under the direction of Jason.

The close relationship between B and D reflected in their common attitude toward Egypt and Syria, as well as in their special emphasis on the Temple ritual, and their common use of the term *Makom* "Place" in referring to God,[107] points to common authorship; and if the suggestion that B was the work of the High Priest Jason be accepted, we may further conjecture that he was also the author of D. It would follow from this that Jason formulated not merely an introduction to the Haggadah to displace that formulated by his father, but also an elaboration of Deuteronomy 26. 5–8, in the form of D, to

[107] Regarding the significance of the use of the terms *Ha-Makom* and *Ha-Kadosh Baruk Hu* in the Passover Haggadah, see Additional Note G.

replace M. The popularity of M, however, and its lack of any statement which contemporary Syrians could understand as hostile, prevented its suppression, so that in later times the Temple authorities used as the Passover Haggadah not B, Deuteronomy 26. 5–8, and D, but BM.

IV. The *Baraita* of the Four Sons (E)[108]

E has already been cited above (Vol. XXXV, pp. 305 f.). It consists, in its present form, of an introduction and four paragraphs, to which (as indicated above) we may refer as E1 (the wise son), E2 (the wicked son), E3 (the simple son) and E4 (the child unable to ask).

A study of E will show that, unlike A, B, D, and M, it has undergone radical changes; and is no longer in the form originally given it. On the other hand, it is possible to reconstruct that form, and to show that in that original form, E was, like A, B, D, and M, pre-Maccabean in origin. Indeed it is older, in its earliest form, than B or D, dating from the same period as A and M, namely the era of Simeon the Righteous, himself.

It is clear that the purpose of E is to explain the four verses in the Pentateuch enjoining upon the father the duty of explaining Jewish ceremonial to his children. Although the passages do not all refer to the ritual of the Passover, they do refer to the Exodus. The compiler of E therefore considers them as redundant, and in accordance with the usual Rabbinic approach

[108] E also occurs in Mekilta Bo, chap. 18, ed. Friedmann 22b, Horowitz-Rabin p. 73, Lauterbach I, p. 166; as well as in Yerushalmi, Pesahim X, 37d. The origin and development of this *baraita* have been widely discussed. See, with regard to it, the notes of Friedmann and Horowitz in the works just cited, and the following: L. Landshut, in Maggid Mereshit, introduction to the Passover Haggadah, Berlin, 1855; Sidon, in Das juedische Literaturblatt, VII, 1878, pp. 110 ff., 114 ff.; the series of articles by David Hoffmann on the subject, in Israel. Monatschrift, 1884, No. 4, pp. 13–14; 1892, No. 4, p. 13; 1894, No. 4, pp. 13–14; Magazin f. d. Wissenschaft d. Judentums, XIII, 1886, pp. 191 ff.; in Bet Vaad La-Hakamim, I, 1902, No. 3, pp. 13 ff.; Ha-Ibri, II, 1911, Nos. 14–15, pp. 164–65; M. Friedmann, in Meir Ayyin al Ha-Haggadah, pp. 42 ff.; A. Marx, in Jewish Quarterly Review, N. S. XIII, 1922–23, p. 517; and XIX, 1928–29, pp. 1 ff.; J. D. Eisenstein, Ozar Perushim ve-Ziyyurim, pp. 9 ff.; A. B. in Ha-Tor, II, 1922, Nos. 24–25, p. 18; S. Lieberman, in Hayerushalmi Kifeshuto, pp. 521 f.; E. D. Goldschmidt, Die Pessach-Haggada, pp. 40 ff.; Cecil Roth, The Haggadah, A New Edition, pp. 14 ff. Hoffmann was the first scholar to recognize the composite character of E, and to show that originally it referred only to three sons.

to the interpretation of Scripture, feels called upon to explain the distinctive significance attaching to each passage. In order to understand E, it is thus necessary to study each of the passages with which it deals. They are Exodus 12. 26 (which we will call A); Exodus 13. 8 (B); Exodus 13. 14 (C); and Deuteronomy 6. 20 (D). The texts of the various passages are as follows:

(A) *Question:* "And it shall come to pass when your children shall say unto you: What mean ye by this service?"

Answer: "Ye shall say, It is the sacrifice of the Lord's passover, for that He passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt, when he smote the Egyptians, and delivered our houses."[109]

(B) *Question:* (lacking).

Answer: "And thou shalt tell thy son in that day, saying: It is because of that which the Lord did for me when I came forth from Egypt."

(C) *Question:* "And it shall be when thy son asketh thee in time to come, saying, What is this?"

Answer: "Thou shalt say unto him, By strength of hand the Lord brought us out from Egypt, from the house of bondage."

(D) *Question:* "When thy son asketh thee in time to come, saying, What mean the testimonies, and statutes, and the ordinances, which the Lord our God hath commanded you?" [110]

Answer: "Then thou shalt say unto thy son, We were Pharaoh's bondmen in Egypt, etc."

Even a cursory examination demonstrates the fact that E is composite. For as it stands now, it fails to fulfil the purpose it sets before itself. To justify the repetition of the commandment that the father recall the exodus to his son, as explanation of the ritual, on the ground that there are various types of sons, who would approach the question differently and would require different forms of reply, the author of E would have to correlate

[109] The four passages do not all deal with the Passover celebration and the question which might be asked concerning it. Indeed, only Exod. 12. 26 ff. and 13. 8 really refer to the Passover ritual. Exod. 13. 14 deals with the redemption of the firstborn; and Deut. 6. 20 ff. with the commandments generally. But it was natural that the similarity of the expressions used in all four passages, and the reference to the Exodus, should have convinced the ancient commentator that all of them dealt with the same situation. This is an implied premise, which colors the whole approach.

[110] For the variant reading of the Septuagint and some texts of the Vulgate, see below.

both questions and replies with his classification of the sons. This, however, he fails to do. So far as the question is concerned, A is supposed to deal with the wicked son; but the reply offered in that passage is completely ignored. Answer B is used for both the wicked son and the child unable to ask. Question D is explained as addressed to the wise son, but reply D is not the verse commanded in Scripture, but a citation from the Mishna![111]

Moreover, the very classification of the sons leaves much to be desired. The classification is essentially based on grade of intellectual development. B applies to the child unable to ask; C to the simple child; and D to the wise child. An entirely new standard is introduced when A is made to refer to the "wicked son."

Light is shed on these problems by the discovery that the section dealing with the wicked son occurs also outside of E, in a completely unrelated *baraita*, preserved in Mekilta, on Exodus 13. 8,[112] which reads as follows:

(*And thou shalt tell thy son in that day saying,*) "*It is because of that which the Lord did for me* (*when I came forth out of Egypt*)."

What purpose is served by this verse? Because the Scriptures say, (above, Exodus 12. 26) "And it shall come to pass when your children shall say unto you, What mean *ye* by this service?" This obviously refers to the wicked son, who has withdrawn from the community. Because he has withdrawn from the community, do thou also reject him from the community, (saying), "It is because of that which the Lord did for me when I came forth out of Egypt." The implication of the phrase *for me* is *not for thee*; that is to say, "Hadst thou been there, thou wouldst not have been redeemed, for thou didst withdraw from the community."

It is clear from a study of this passage that its author was either unacquainted with E or rejected its basic teaching. For according to E, there is no point to the question raised in this passage. Exodus 13. 8 is intended, according to E, to apply to the son who is unable to ask questions, and has to be given an explanation of the Passover without any preliminary inquiry.

[111] This difficulty was noticed by Don Isaac Abrabanel in his commentary on the Passover Haggadah.

[112] Ed. Friedmann 21a, Horowitz-Rabin p. 66, Lauterbach I, p. 149. Mekilta of R. Simeon ben Yohai 12. 26, ed. Hoffmann, p. 21, cites this interpretation in a somewhat abbreviated form.

The passage of Mekilta just cited indicates, however, no awareness of this obligation to explain the Passover to the child who is unable to ask. The author of the passage therefore properly asks what purpose is intended by the verse, Exodus 13. 8, in offering an explanation of the Passover, beyond that given in other verses.

It is equally obvious that the author of E was unaware of or rejected the comment now found in the passage cited from Mekilta. For, had the author of E known and accepted that comment, he would not have said that Exodus 13. 8 is intended as a statement for the son who is unable to ask; the comment in Mekilta would have indicated to him that Exodus 13. 8 is really an extended reply to the question presented in Exodus 12. 26.

These considerations suggest, of course, that the part of E dealing with the wicked son is really an insertion; and that originally E consisted of only three paragraphs dealing with the wise son, the simple son, and the son who cannot ask questions. This suggestion is strengthened by the fact that the paragraph about the wicked son occurs, according to one text of E, after that of the simple son; while in the other two texts, it precedes the paragraph about the simple son. Such difference between texts in regard to the location of a paragraph frequently indicates a later insertion.

It follows from these considerations that E in its present form consists of a combination of two different, and, indeed, opposing traditions.[113] The first is a tradition which knows of *three* sons:[114]

[113] Azulai in his commentary on the Passover Haggadah (Simhat Ha-Regel, Lemberg, 1863) suggests that Exod. 12. 26 deals with two types of children, the good and the wicked, and therefore uses the plural, "your children," while the other passages speak only of "thy son." Similarly, and with a modern approach, Hoffmann in a series of articles indicates his belief that the present form of E has resulted from a combination of two earlier texts, one of which knew of three types of sons, the wise, the foolish, and the one too young to ask; the other dealt with two types of sons, the pious (*tam*) and the wicked (see his articles listed in note 108). As will be seen below, however, the reading *tam*, on which this analysis is based, is a euphemism introduced in the Passover Haggadah, for the word *tippesh* "fool," used in the older forms of E.

[114] It should be noted, perhaps, that another part of the Passover celebration, which at present has four parts, originally had only three. The "four questions" formulated for the child in the extant rituals are an expansion of *three* questions prescribed in the Mishna, according to the best texts (so Mishna Pesahim 10. 4, as printed in Yer. Pesahim 37b.; Mishna, ed. Lowe, p. 48; and other texts cited in ed. Wilna, 1927).

the youngest son, unable to ask, Exodus 13. 8; the simple son, who only asks, "What is this?"; and the wise son of Deuteronomy 6. 20. The author of E, in its original form, did not take Exodus 12. 26 into account because that verse speaks of "children" (in the plural), and therefore may be taken to include the children referred to in the other verses, all of which read "thy son" in the singular. Furthermore, Exodus 12. 26 does not use the word "ask" but "say."

The tradition preserved in Mekilta on Exodus 13. 8 derives from a totally different background. It doubtless reflects the widespread apostasy from Rabbinic Judaism in the latter part of the first and the beginning of the second century. Some of those who rejected the ceremonial law were Christians; others, like Elisha ben Abuyah, were merely Romanophiles.[115] The author of this *baraita* finds a reference to these men "who withdraw from the community" in the question, "What mean *ye* by this service?" (The English rendering hardly can be made to supply the force which can be put into the Hebrew; according to the author of the comment in Mekilta the passage should be interpreted, "What is all this drudgery of yours for?"[116]) The author doubtless notes that in this instance the Scriptures use the word "say," which might be a challenge, rather than "ask," which could only be an inquiry.

A later compiler, knowing both traditions, combined them; and transformed the older *baraita* of three sons into one of four sons.

In addition to recognizing that the whole of E2 is an insertion from another source, it is important to note that E1 is no longer in its original form. This seems obvious from the fact that while the question cites the Scripture according to a reading which seems to have disappeared from the Hebrew text at an early date, the reply cites a passage from the Mishna, and is therefore probably to be dated after the rise of the Schools of Shammai and Hillel in the first century of the Christian Era.[117]

[115] See my remarks in Akiba, pp. 254 ff.

[116] This excellent rendering is that of Maurice Samuel, in his translation of the Passover Haggadah (New York, 1942).

[117] For the date of Mishna Pesahim, chap. X, see D. Hoffmann, Die Erste Mischna, Beilage z. Jahres-Bericht d. Rabbiner-Seminars zu Berlin, pro 1881–82, pp. 16 ff.;

The question reads: "What mean the testimonies, and the statutes, and the ordinances which the Lord our God hath commanded *us*?"[118] As noted above, the reading "commanded us" is found only in the Septuagint and those texts of the Vulgate which appear to be dependent on it.[119] The Massoretic Text, and all the other versions, including the Samaritan, read, "commanded *you*."[120] In view of the agreement of the other versions and the Massoretic Text, this reading must be presumed to be at least as old as the middle of the second century B.C. The passage containing the pre-Massoretic reading must therefore belong to an earlier period.

Further suspicion on the originality of the present text of E1 is cast by the fact that it does not really make sense. The injunction to "teach him the laws of the Passover, etc." cannot be considered a reply to the question asked. The particular rule mentioned is only one of many, and there seems no special reason for its mention. Friedmann, in his notes on Mekilta 22b, suggests therefore, that the particular passage is cited because the compiler of E knew it as the *last* of the rules of the Passover; in other words, the final passage in his text of Mishna Pesahim. Friedmann believes therefore that the correct reading of the passage should be "Teach him the laws of the Passover ritual *until* (the passage) 'It is forbidden to end the Passover meal with entertainment.'" Friedmann states that he recalls seeing the word *'ad* ("until") in some text, but was unable to locate it at the time of his writing the note.[121] I, too, have been unable to locate any such text of E despite my examination of numerous texts of the Passover Haggadah. On the other hand, there are texts where the passage, "It is forbidden to end the Passover meal with entertainment," is replaced by the one

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Zebi Carl, Pesahim, Introduction, pp. LXXII ff. and Appendix I, pp. 93 ff. This view is also adumbrated, apparently, by M. Friedmann in his edition of Mekilta 22b, note 23.

[118] See above, note 38, for the variant readings of the different texts of the Passover Haggadah.

[119] See variant readings in Biblia Sacra iuxta Latinam Vulgatam Versionem, Rome, 1936, ad loc.

[120] This reading is also found in Vetus Latina, see U. Robert, Pentateuchi Versio Latina Antiquissima, Paris, 1881.

[121] See also Friedmann, pp. 44 ff.

word, *afikoman* ("entertainment") the last word in the sentence, according to the original. This obvious abbreviation of the text suggests the likelihood that the larger citation, which includes the whole passage, "It is forbidden, etc.," is likewise an abbreviation, standing for the whole of the tenth chapter of Pesahim. Accordingly, the text required the father to teach his son *all* the laws of the Passover ritual, ending with the final norm, "It is forbidden, etc." This would mean that at one time E included in itself, at this point, the whole of what now constitutes Mishna Pesahim 10. 1–7; and required that part of the Mishna to be offered as reply to the wise son.[122] For the sake of brevity the transmitters of E omitted everything but the last line of the Mishna in citing it, some going so far as to omit everything but the last word. In any event, it is clear that the passage goes back to a time when the tenth chapter of Mishna Pesahim still did not contain the three last paragraphs of the present text; for in our text, the statement, "It is forbidden to end the Passover meal with entertainment," is paragraph 7, and is followed by several other rules.

But it is also clear that, in its earliest form, E could not have contained either the present abbreviated quotation from Mishna Pesahim, chapter X, or even the older, unabbreviated quotation of the whole chapter. As its purpose is to explain the significance of each passage in the Torah mentioning the inquiring son, E necessarily had to deal with each question and answer, and to show how both applied to distinctive types of children. E1 indicates how question D applies to the wise son; but in substituting a passage from Rabbinic literature for that provided in Scripture, it evades the main issue.[123] It follows therefore that in the original form of E1 the reply to the wise son must have been that provided in D, namely, the passage beginning, "We were Pharaoh's bondmen, etc." This part of E1 had to be changed because in the course of time, as we have seen, the practice changed; and the use of the reply "We were

[122] This interpretation is that given in Friedmann, loc. cit., and notes on Mekilta. It is also implied in the comment of Abrabanel on the passage.

[123] Rabbi Elijah Gaon of Wilna, taking note of this difficulty, explains that E requires both the biblical answer, Deut. 6. 21, "We were Pharaoh's bondmen, etc.," as well as the citation from the Mishna.

Pharaoh's bondmen, etc." fell into desuetude, being replaced by the passage, denominated B, above.

We have seen [124] that the substitution of B for A in the Passover Haggadah occurred, probably, about the year 175 B.C.

This, then, is the *terminus ad quem* for the original formulation of E. After that time, there was no way in which the various passages in Scripture dealing with the inquiring son could be explained in such a way as to harmonize with existing practice; for the most important son, namely the wise one, of Deuteronomy 6. 20, was given another answer than that prescribed.

This explains the fact that the biblical text in E1 follows the reading preserved in the Septuagint. E1 derives from a time when the Hebrew text was still in the form which lay before the authors of the Septuagint, antedating that of all the other versions.

The period 175–172, when B was formulated, is also the *terminus a quo* for the revision of E1, by the substitution of the citation from the Mishna for the original answer, that prescribed in Scripture. It is probable, however, as we have seen, that the adaptation of E to current practice was made much later, in the first generation of the Christian Era.

The text of E as cited in Yerushalmi from the collection of R. Hiyya differs from those in the Passover Haggadah and Mekilta in interchanging the replies of the wise and the foolish sons. According to R. Hiyya's tradition, reply B is offered to the wise son; while as to the foolish son, who asks, "What is this?" the father is instructed, "Do thou therefore teach him the laws of the Passover ritual, *namely that* it is forbidden to end the Passover meal with entertainment."

It is clear that the text of Mekilta and the Passover Haggadah is, in this respect, to be preferred to that of Yerushalmi. For reply B is prescribed in Scripture to the inquiry, "What is this?" which is imputed to the simple or foolish child according to all texts, and not to the longer question, "What are the testimonies, and the statutes, etc.," which all texts agree in imputing to the wise son. Moreover, it is intrinsically more

[124] See above, Vol. XXXV, p. 326.

natural that instruction in the Law should be offered to the wise son, rather than the simple or foolish one. It follows that the present text of Yerushalmi must be the result of either a copyist's or a transmitter's error or editorial revision. On careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that the change was editorial, probably made by R. Hiyya himself. The reason for the change was the failure of the transmitter or compiler to understand that the phrase, "teach him the laws of Passover, etc.," referred not to the particular rule mentioned, but to the whole chapter, ending with that passage. R. Hiyya could not have guessed this latter meaning, for the Mishna of Pesahim, chapter X, in his day no longer ended with the passage, "It is forbidden, etc." He therefore supposed that this rule was selected by the author of E for some special reason. Why? Because the son was likely to indulge in revelry after the Passover meal. But what type of son was to be warned against such behavior? Certainly not the wise son; but rather the foolish son. Hence, R. Hiyya came to the conclusion that the text he had received ought to be emended, by making reply B that addressed to the wise son (A); and declaring that the suggestion, "Do thou therefore teach him the laws of the Passover ritual, namely that it is forbidden, etc.," was intended as reply to the foolish son.[125]

We may therefore conclude that E passed through the following stages of development:

A. A *baraita* of three sons, which read, "The Torah deals with three types of children, the 'wise son,' the 'foolish son,' and the child who cannot ask. (*a*) The wise son says, 'What mean the testimonies and the statutes, and the ordinances,

[125] Azulai, in his commentary, cited above, quotes a manuscript of the commentary on the Passover Haggadah by R. Isaiah di Trani according to which the reply "Do thou therefore teach him the laws of the Passover ritual, etc.," was given *to the wicked son*. We have no other trace of such a version of E, and it seems probable that the manuscript of the commentary used by Azulai was defective, for in the ed. of R. Isaiah di Trani's commentary on the Passover Haggadah (see M. Krengel, Shaare Geulah, Cracow, 1896, p. 17) the response is assigned to the "wise son" as in other rituals. Azulai, referring to the view of R. Isaiah as recorded in his commentary on the Passover Haggadah, and as cited further in Shibbale Haleket, assumes that R. Isaiah changed his mind regarding the proper text of E (see Simhat Ha-Regel, Lwow, 1782, 100a).

which the Lord, our God, hath commanded us?' Do thou also reply to him, 'We were Pharaoh's bondmen in Egypt, and the Lord brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm.' (*b*) The 'foolish son' says 'What is this?' And thou shalt say unto him, 'By strength of hand the Lord brought us out from Egypt, from the house of bondage.' As for the child who cannot ask, do thou begin for him, even as it is written. 'And thou shalt tell thy son in that day saying: It is because of this which the Lord did for me when I came forth from Egypt.'"

This *baraita* was compiled, as we have seen, either toward the end of the third century or in the first third of the second century B.C. To sum up, the evidence for this derives from the following considerations: (1) it follows the reading of the Scriptures according to the Septuagint, in opposition to all other texts; (2) the reply to the "wise son" was changed between 175 and 172 B.C., and no *baraita* compiled after that date would have assumed the reply to the "wise son" to be that prescribed in the original form of E.

B. Some time between 175 B.C. and the year 70 of the Christian Era (but probably much nearer the latter date than the former) E was revised to conform with current practice, which no longer used the reply prescribed in it for the "wise son." Hence the reply to the "wise son" was changed from the statement "we were Pharaoh's bondmen, etc.," and made into a recitation of the rules of the Passover. Perhaps this was done for the very purpose of inculcating respect among the many pilgrims for the emerging compilations of the Rabbinic tradition. It doubtless was of some importance that one of these compilations should be prescribed as the proper reply to a "wise son" making inquiry about the Passover.

C. In the second century of the Christian Era, the *baraita* was further revised by the interpolation of an extraneous passage, from quite another source, dealing with the "wicked son."

D. Another change was made by R. Hiyya, toward the very end of the second century or early in the third century B.C.; a change, however, which has affected only the text cited from

R. Hiyya's collection in the Yerushalmi, namely the interchange of the replies to the wise and to the foolish son, with each other.

E. A final change was made when the *baraita* itself was introduced into the Passover Haggadah. The reference to the child who asked the simple question, "What is this?" as the "foolish son" seemed inconsistent with the purpose of the Passover celebration, as conceived in later Rabbinic times, to stimulate questions by the children, so that they may learn. Hence the opprobrious term *tippesh* (fool) used in E, according to the versions found in both Mekilta and Yerushalmi, was replaced in the Passover Haggadah by the less objectionable expression *tam*, "the simple son."

The *baraita* was introduced into the Passover Haggadah from some source other than R. Hiyya's collection; since the change, noted under D, was not included in the text of the Passover Haggadah.

APPENDIX

THE DATE OF THE BOOK OF JUBILEES

Eduard Meyer,[126] and, following him, W. F. Albright,[127] have indicated their belief that the Book of Jubilees was composed about the beginning of the second century B.C. The light thrown on the pre-Maccabean struggles between the priests and the laity definitely shows that the preconceptions which led R. H. Charles and others to date the book toward the end of the second century B.C. must now be reconsidered. It appears to me, however, that the *terminus a quo* for the book is provided by its severe denunciation of the Greek habit of appearing naked in the gymnasia. According to the author, Noah commanded his sons, (*a*) "to observe righteousness, and (*b*) to cover the shame of the flesh, and (*c*) to bless their Creator, and (*d*) to honor father and mother, and (*e*) to love their neighbor, and (*f*) to guard their souls from fornication and uncleanness and all iniquity" (Jubilees 7. 20). As I have shown,[128] these six commandments are really a paraphrase of the six Noachic commandments of the Rabbinic tradition. This can be proved from the fact that the commandment "to observe righteousness" is the precise equivalent of *dinim* or "the observance of civil laws" in the Rabbinical form of the Noachic code; and the curious relation of the commandment "to bless their Creator," to that of *birkat ha-shem*, literally, "blessing the Name of God," but used in its own context euphemistically for a prohibition against blasphemy. Either the writer of the Book of Jubilees decided to substitute the positive commandment to bless God for the negative commandment of the Pharisaic code, or the Greek translator misunderstood the meaning of the Hebrew. The sixth, the commandment against fornication, is identical with that of the Rabbinical Noachic

[126] Ursprung u. Anfaenge d. Christentums, II, pp. 45 ff.

[127] From the Stone Age to Christianity, pp. 266 ff.

[128] H. T. R., XVI, 1923, pp. 59 ff.; and Journal of Biblical Literature, XLIX, 1930, pp. 21 ff. Ch. Albeck, Das Buch d. Jubilaeen u. d. Halacha, Berlin, 1930, p. 34 is alone in denying any association between this passage in Jubilees and the Noachic laws of the Talmud. He is right, however, in rejecting E. Schuerer's thesis that the author of the Book of Jubilees could not have known of the Rabbinic code of Noachic laws, and created one which was entirely independent of that known to normative Judaism (see Schuerer[4] III, p. 179). Albeck asserts (p. 59) that "*die Angaben Finkelsteins S. 60 f. wie seine Ausfuehrungen sind unrichtig*" and proceeds simply to refer to the midrashic texts which I cite without further discussion. A re-examination of these texts does not indicate to me any need for the change either of the interpretations I gave, or the conclusions I drew. The view that the passage in Jubilees is closely associated with the Rabbinic tradition regarding the Noachic laws is further upheld by L. Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews, V, p. 193, note 67; and M. Guttmann, Das Judentum u. seine Umwelt, p. 105.

code. The other three items in the Noachic code of the Book of Jubilees take the place of the prohibitions against idolatry, against homicide, and theft in the corresponding Rabbinic code. It is easy to see that the writer might well have decided to replace the prohibition of murder with the commandment to love one's neighbor; the prohibition of idolatry with the commandment to honor one's father and mother (for there was little danger of idolatry in Israel at the moment); and the commandment against theft seemed included in that to observe righteousness; thus leaving a lacuna which could be filled by the prohibition against appearing naked.

Now we know that one of the worst charges against Jason was his establishment of a gymnasium where the youth of Jerusalem disported themselves naked, after the manner of the Greeks (I Maccabees 1. 14; II Maccabees 4. 11). It is clear that what evoked the denunciation of the zealous author was this situation and not any awareness of the habits of the Greeks in their own cities. The year 175 B.C. when Jason became high priest is thus the *terminus a quo* for this book.

Presumably, however, the book was composed while the issue was still a burning one; for after the Maccabean wars the issue was ended for the Jews, and it would no longer have been necessary to stress the "covering of the flesh" as one of the cardinal ordinances of all human life, revealed by God to Noah.

There is other evidence pointing to the period preceding the Maccabean wars as the date of this book. In the following passage, the author evidently projects the situation of the third century and early decades of the second century B.C. to the period of the patriarchs: "For he (Joseph) knew that the Egyptians would not bring him forth and bury him in the land of Canaan, for Makamaron, king of Canaan, *while dwelling in Assyria*, fought in the valley with the King of Egypt and slew him there, and pursued after the Egyptians to the gates of Ermon. But he was not able to enter, for another, a new king, had become king of Egypt, and he was stronger than he (the king of Canaan) and he returned to Canaan, and the gates of Egypt were closed, and none went out and none came into Egypt" (Jubilees 46. 6 ff.). The reference to the king of Canaan, dwelling in Assyria, seems a direct reflection of the Seleucid conditions; for to the Palestinian the Seleucids were kings of Coele-Syria, primarily, though they sometimes resided in distant Mesopotamia. The closing of the frontiers of Egypt because of the war conditions is an obvious reflection of the situations which developed in the period of Seleucid-Ptolemaic struggle for Palestine. Moreover, the author continues, "And the king of Egypt went forth to war with the king of Canaan in the forty-seventh jubilee . . . and the children of Israel brought forth all the bones of the children of Jacob save the bones of Joseph, and they buried them in the field in the double cave in the mountain. And most (of them) re-

turned to Egypt, but a few remained in the mountains of Hebron." Certainly, this description of an invasion of Palestine by Egypt, in which the Egyptian army included a number of Jewish soldiers who remained in Palestine, seems to be a projection of contemporary conditions. The account of the war ends with the following verses: "And the king of Canaan was victorious over the king of Egypt, and he closed the gates of Egypt. And he devised an evil device against the children of Israel of afflicting them; and he said unto the people of Egypt: 'Behold the people of the children of Israel have increased and multiplied more than we. Come and let us deal wisely with them before they become too many, and let us afflict them with slavery before war come upon us and before they too fight against us; else they will join themselves unto our enemies and get them up out of our land, for their hearts and faces are towards the land of Canaan.'" Here again we note the conditions of the Hellenistic age, though they are projected in a somewhat changed form into that of the patriarchs. Ultimately Palestine falls into the hands of the king of Canaan (the Seleucids); and he closes the frontiers of Egypt. This is doubtless a projection into earlier antiquity of the interruption of trade which so greatly disturbed the Jews, after the conquest of Palestine by Antiochus III (see above notes 67–68). The author is keenly aware, too, of the fear of the imperial government that the Jews of the country might prove disloyal to it. It is in the light of the Seleucid apprehensions regarding the pro-Egyptian party among the Jews and the efforts made to prevent that party from taking the side of Egypt in a war, that the author interprets Exodus 1. 9.

This vivid awareness of conditions as they developed during Syrian-Egyptian wars would itself make it probable that the writer lived in the early part of the second century. It is true that the story of the Egyptian-Canaanite wars of patriarchal times occurs also in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs (Testament of Simon 8 and Testament of Benjamin 12) and that the story in Jubilees may be dependent on that account, or both accounts may come from some earlier source, which has been lost. But the story in the Book of Jubilees has peculiarities of its own, which seem to have been composed by the author of that work, and therefore may be used in fixing his date.

It is further noteworthy that the Book of Jubilees is definitely hostile to Egypt and friendly to Syria. The author considers it meritorious that the patriarchs should marry Aramaean women (Jubilees 34. 20; 41. 1). He records that the "people of Egypt abominated the children of Israel" (Jubilees 46. 16), thus projecting the Egyptian antisemitism of his own time to an earlier age! But in making this projection he is still apparently unaware of the development of Seleucid antisemitism under Antiochus IV.

The period of the author seems further to be determined by his attitude toward the priesthood. Following other writers on the subject I assumed in my earlier discussions [129] that the Book of Jubilees is pro-priestly in its tendencies. A re-examination of the evidence shows that this is an error. It is noteworthy that neither the Book of Jubilees, nor the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs which is so closely related to it, mentions Aaron, though both mention Moses, and the Book of Jubilees mentions also Amram (46. 10) and even Miriam (47. 4). The emphasis put on Levi, as high priest, and the ancestor of priests, in both the Book of Jubilees and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, must therefore be understood as referring to the whole tribe of Levi, rather than to the Aaronids alone.[130] It is noteworthy, in this connection, too, that the halaka of the Book of Jubilees definitely destroys the distinction between the Aaronids and the other Levites with regard to the law of tithes, holding that the tithes are to be given to the sons of Levi who are the priests, and that the tithe of the tithe, which according to the Pentateuch (Numbers 18. 25 ff.) belongs to the Aaronids, is to be consumed by the Levites themselves within the Temple precincts.[131]

In the light of this tendency to obliterate the distinction between the Aaronids and the Levites, the Book of Jubilees must, like the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, derive from circles closely associated with the Chronicler who, like the author of these works, is strongly pro-Levite in his sympathies.[132]

The movement which found literary expression in the work of the Chronicler doubtless had wide ramifications. We must bear in mind that this movement was able to influence the formulation of the charter of liberties granted the Jews by Antiochus III (regarding which, see above, Vol. XXXV, p. 314). In that Charter, the Levitical singers were for the first time given official recognition as exempt from taxation. Undoubtedly this Charter was drawn up only after consultation with Jewish leaders; indeed, John, of the priestly clan of Hakkoz, the father of Eupolemus, who was later sent by Judah the Maccabee as envoy to the Romans, seems to have been one of the most important of these leaders (II Maccabees 4. 11). The recognition granted to the Levitical singers and scribes was thus an achievement of importance

[129] See HTR, loc. cit., p. 53; and Journal of Biblical Literature, XLIX, 1930, pp. 34 ff.

[130] See Ch. Albeck, op. cit., p. 30, whose views in this regard I now completely accept.

[131] See HTR, loc. cit., p. 53; Ch. Albeck, op. cit., pp. 30 ff.

[132] See R. H. Pfeiffer, Introduction to the Old Testament, pp. 794 ff.; G. V. Rad, Das Geschichtsbild d. Chronistischen Werkes, pp. 88 ff.; Rothstein-Haenel, Kommentar z. ersten Buch d. Chronik, II, pp. XXXIII ff.; cf. W. F. Albright, in Journal of Biblical Literature, XL, 1921, p. 119.

not only for the Jews as a people, but for the special group within Judaism which had sought this recognition. In the public reading of the Torah, presumably organized into its present ritual form during the third century B.C., the Aaronid was given precedence, of course; but the status of the Levite, too, was recognized, and he was given the second place.[133] The Sect of Damascus, which is so closely related in its outlook, and probably also in the date of its origin, to the Book of Jubilees, similarly recognizes the Levites as a special group, second only to the Aaronids, and above the other members of the House of Israel.[134]

The Book of Jubilees, like the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, goes further than the other works, in completely obliterating all distinction between Aaronid and Levite. It is hard to believe that any such effort could have been undertaken during the Maccabean period, when the Jews as a whole must have felt so endlessly indebted to the Hasmonean family for their leadership in the war. Nor is it credible that after the great victory for the Torah, signalized in the frustration of the Syrians by the handful of Maccabees, any group of Jews would be willing to accept or to sponsor such deviations from the Law as were proposed in the Book of Jubilees.[135]

It is especially noteworthy that the Book of Jubilees reflects none of the bitterness which was engendered by the break between the Pharisees and the Sadducees. On the contrary, its deviations from normative Judaism are intended consistently as compromises, intended to bring together the extreme wings of *observant* Judaism.[136] The only group to which it is definitely opposed is that of apostates and Hellenizers. The issues with which it deals are thus definitely dated, and are not only earlier than the last years of the high priesthood of John Hyrcan[137] but also earlier than the outbreak of the Maccabean wars. It is only when we realize that the book was written before the time of Hasmonean high priests, in the days of such men as Jason and Menelaus, that we can understand the writer's denunciation of the contemporary high priests for their pollution of the innermost shrine of the Temple, presumably by entering it against the law, and violating the ritual regulations regarding the ceremonial

[133] Mishna, Gittin 5. 8.

[134] See S. Schechter, Documents of Jewish Sectaries, Cambridge, 1910, p. 14, line 3; cf. also ibid., p. 13, line 3; Leonard Rost, Die Damaskusschrift, Berlin, 1933, p. 25; R. H. Charles, Apochrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament II, p. 831. For the discussion of the passage, see L. Ginzberg, Eine unbekannte juedische Sekte, 1922, pp. 124 ff.

[135] Cf. Ch. Albeck, op. cit., pp. 35–36; and cf. HTR, XVI, 1923, pp. 42 ff.; as well as Monatsschrift, LXXVI, 1932, pp. 525 ff.

[136] See L. Finkelstein, The Pharisees, pp. 113 f.

[137] So R. H. Charles, The Book of Jubilees, p. LIX.

of the Day of Atonement, when they were commanded to enter it (Jubilees 23. 21).

The book was composed by a writer who revered the sanctuary, but held the men who in his time were at its head, in contempt. He is a writer fierce in his indignation against the high priesthood, and yet sympathetic to views which we find associated with the Temple hierarchy.

The fact that the book contains no reference whatever to the persecution is also significant for its date. The passage Jubilees 23. 12, in which Charles (op. cit., p. LXIII) sees an apocalypse predicting the persecution and the Maccabean war, does not, it seems to me, warrant that interpretation. The passage does, indeed, describe (23. 16) the decay of Judaism under Hellenistic influence, and the rise of bitter conflicts among the Jews (ibid., v. 19). The battle referred to in verse 20, when "they will stand (with bows and) swords and war to turn them (the sinful) back into the way; but they will not return until much blood has been shed" cannot refer to the Maccabean struggle; for it is followed by a prediction of even graver decay of religion (v. 21). On the contrary, the reference must be to an earlier struggle, perhaps an unrecorded civil struggle between the Hellenizers and the Hasids. The last historical reference in the passage seems to be that to Antiochus IV's ravages in Jerusalem on his return from the ill-fated expedition into Egypt in 169 B.C. The author predicts that God "will wake up against them (the sinful in Israel) the sinners of the Gentiles, who have neither mercy nor compassion, and who will respect the person of none, neither old nor young, nor anyone, for they are more wicked strong to do evil than all the children of men (v. 23)." The description of the horrible times continues for several verses, culminating in the announcement of the Messianic age (vv. 27 ff.). The passage seems to prove beyond question that the writer did not witness the profanation of the Temple by Antiochus IV; otherwise, he certainly would not have failed to refer to it.

These considerations make it likely that the Book of Jubilees was composed some time during the turbulent period dividing the appointment of Jason as high priest (175 B.C.) and the final profanation of the Temple by Antiochus (167 B.C.).

ADDITIONAL NOTE A

The Relationship of Egyptian Antisemitism to the Story of the Exodus

The close relationship between Egyptian antisemitism and the Jewish history of the Exodus has been demonstrated by V. Tscherikower in Ha-Yehudim veha-Yevanim, pp. 368 ff. Indeed, in view of

the nature of the charges made by the Egyptian writers against the Jews, it is difficult to understand how this relationship can possibly be doubted. In addition to the other evidence heretofore available, it is clear from the discussion of Psalms 78 and 105 (Vol. XXXV, p. 299), that the Egyptians of the third century B.C. were highly sensitive to the suggestion that their ancestors had been punished with the plague of "boils" and that this fact was known, and taken into account, in Palestine. The story of the Exodus as related by Hecateus of Abdera, who certainly was not unfriendly to the Jews, reflects this particular sensitivity, and indeed the unpleasant feeling which Egyptians had regarding the story of the Exodus generally. According to him, the Egyptian population, at the time of the Exodus, suffered from an epidemic, and it was believed popularly that this visitation was due to the anger of the gods at the sufferance granted foreign people to follow their own religious practices, while those of the Egyptian gods were neglected.

Following this development, the strangers were expelled; and the more distinguished among them, led by Danaus and Cadmos, settled in Greece; the mass of them, following a leader by the name of Moses, founded the country known as Judaea. See Reinach, Textes d'Auteurs grecs et romains relatifs au Judaïsme, Paris, 1895 (hereinafter Reinach, Textes), pp. 14 ff.

This is a moderately Egyptophilic reformulation of the Jewish account of the Exodus (see Reinach, op. cit., p. 15, n. 1). Manetho, living apparently a little later than Hecateus, gives another account of the Exodus, definitely less favorable to the Jews. According to him, the men of Jerusalem were descended in part from the Hyksos, and in part from Egyptian lepers and cripples. The discussion of Psalms 78 and 105 shows further, as indicated above, that the charge of "ass-worship," made against the Jews by the Seleucid antisemites of Maccabean times, had sufficiently spread in the third century B.C., under the Ptolemaic rule, to affect the manner in which the Psalmists described the ten plagues. In view of this fact, it is obviously impossible to accept the statement of Josephus (Against Apion, II, 90), whose views are followed by E. Bickermann (Monatsschrift f. Gesch. u. Wissenschaft d. Judentums (hereafter Monatsschrift), LXXI, 1927, pp. 84 ff.; and Der Gott d. Makkabaeer, 1937, pp. 22 ff.) and I. Heinemann (art. Antisemitismus in PWRE suppl. V, 3 ff.; Festgabe z. zehnjaehrigen Bestehen d. Akademie f. d. Wissenschaft d. Judentums, 1929, 76 ff.; and Zion [Hebr. periodical] IV, 1939, p. 279), to the effect that the antisemitic doctrines were only the creations of the Seleucids, in their attempt to justify the atrocities of Antiochus IV. There can, of course, be no doubt that Hellenistic antisemitism entered a new phase, when the older, unofficial and popular misinterpretation of Judaism was replaced by a new antisemitic propaganda,

fostered as a political instrument of the Seleucid empire. But it seems certain, in view of the available evidence, that the antisemitic charges themselves originated in Egypt, and were chiefly the response of the Egyptian priests to the story of the Exodus and the doctrine of Jewish monotheism (see further with regard to the origins of antisemitic propaganda, the material assembled in Bousset-Gressmann, Die Religion d. Judentums in Spaethellenistischen Zeitalter, 1926, pp. 75 ff.). Because the early Ptolemies were friendly to the Jews (Fuchs, Die Juden Aegyptens, 5 ff.) and doubtless because Egypt already contained a considerable Jewish population (ibid.), the Egyptian historians of the third entury B.C. were particularly careful to avoid giving offense to *Egyptian* Jews. It is apparently for this reason that Manetho avoids any mention of "Jews" in his story of the Exodus; he deals only with Jerusalem and its inhabitants, the *Solymitai* (Jos., Against Apion I, 90, 241, 248). Heinemann (PWRE, loc. cit.) infers from this, quite correctly, I believe, that Manetho's treatise was "concerned only with the founding of the neighboring state" (i.e. the Temple state of Jerusalem or Judaea), "but not with the origin of the Jewish people." Heinemann fails, however, to draw the correct conclusion from this interesting observation, namely, that Manetho's discussion is intended to lay the juristic basis for the Ptolemaic claim to overlordship of Palestine; and that the author tried to establish this claim in such a manner as to avoid giving any possible offense to the Jews of his own country.

As the antisemitic interpretation of the Exodus spread, the efforts of the Jews to counteract it grew. Thus, the Jews, who had probably originated the identification of the patriarchs with the Hyksos, later tried to obliterate it. Hence the emphasis in M on the fact that Jacob came to Egypt with a small number, and without any desire to remain there. "*And he (Jacob) went down into Egypt,* — compelled by the Divine commandment. *And sojourned there* — this teaches us that he did not go to settle, but to sojourn for a period, as it is said, 'They said moreover unto Pharaoh, To sojourn in the land are we come, for thy servants have no pasture for their flocks, for the famine is sore in the land of Canaan; now, therefore, we pray thee, let thy servants dwell in the land of Goshen (Genesis 47. 4).' *Few in number* — as it is said, 'Thy fathers went down into Egypt with three-score and ten persons; and now the Lord thy God hath made thee as the stars of heaven for multitude (Deuteronomy 10. 22).'" (The italicized passages are from Deuteronomy 26. 5; the rest is the comment of M on the passages.) The passage in M is clearly intended to describe Jacob as coming into Egypt with a small family, in order to escape death by starvation. Significantly enough, no reference is made to Joseph, though such a reference would obviously be flattering to the Jews, and one which they would have liked to make on the occasion of the Passover celebration. The thought implied in this passage is expressed

even more clearly in a comment, preserved on the same passage of Deuteronomy, in Sifre 301 (ed. Friedmann, 128a; ed. Finkelstein, p. 319; D. Hoffman, Midrash Tannaim, p. 172): "*And he went down into Egypt* — Lest you think that he went down into Egypt to assume a royal crown, the Scriptures add *and he sojourned there.* Lest you think he came with great hosts, the Scriptures add, *few in number*, as it is said, 'Thy fathers went down into Egypt, three-score and ten.'" While the Sifre in its present form was probably compiled no earlier than the third century of our era, there can be little doubt that this particular passage is of much higher antiquity. There can be no question of the purpose these comments are intended to serve. They are an explicit denial of any association of the Jews or their ancestors, the Israelites, with an invasion of Egypt, "to assume a royal crown" or "with great hosts." It is extremely interesting in this connection to note again the account of the coming of Israel into Egypt, as given in Psalm 105. 16–22; particularly stressing the enslavement of Joseph: "And He called a famine upon the land; He broke the whole staff of bread. He sent a man before them; Joseph was sold for a servant; his feet they hurt with fetters, his person was laid in iron. Until the time that His word came to pass, the word of the Lord tested him. The king sent and loosed him, even the ruler of the peoples, and set him free. He made him lord of his house, and ruler of all his possessions; to bind his princes at his pleasure, and teach his elders wisdom."

It is entirely possible that the same type of resentment which led the Egyptians of the third century B.C. to re-tell the story of the Exodus was in some way responsible for the sufferings visited on the Israelites of Yeb, more than two centuries earlier. Certainly the singular document, referring to the directions given by King Darius for the observance of the Passover at Yeb (see A. Cowley, Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century, B.C., Oxford, 1923, pp. 60 ff.), requires further explanation. The interest of the Persian government in such details of Jewish ritual can only be explained if objection was raised to the observances by the Egyptians. One of the reasons for the objection may have been the use of animal sacrifices by the Jews; but in that event it would naturally be expected that the statement of the government would deal with the issue of animal sacrifices specifically. The reference to the Passover celebration seems to indicate that the Egyptians of the period (apparently 419 B.C.) objected to the observance of this festival; and that the imperial Persian government sided with the Israelites, against the Egyptians. Perhaps, the resentment aroused by this victory of the Israelites, through their influence at the Imperial Court, led to the destruction of the Temple, eleven years later, when the power of the central imperial government became weaker (see Cowley, op. cit., pp. 97–109, but cf. A. Vincent, La Religion des Judéo-Araméens d'Elephantine, 1937, pp. 254 ff.).

ADDITIONAL NOTE B

Apologetic Changes in the Jewish Liturgy

Apologetic changes in Jewish ritual and other parts of Jewish literature were made at various times: in antiquity, in the Middle Ages, and even in modern times. The changes were introduced (*a*) perforce under orders of the government; or (*b*) as part of self-censorship to avoid giving offense to the government; or (*c*) out of sheer devotion to the state. An example of a drastic change in the ritual, introduced probably at the behest of the imperial government, is the recorded idolatry of Ahaz and Manasseh, and was intended to indicate their loyalty to their Assyrian suzerain (cf. R. Kittel, Gesch. d. Volkes Israel,[3] 1917, II, 574). The Egyptophilism of the Septuagint is well recognized and was, indeed, known to the Rabbinic authorities (see Mekilta, Bo 14, Friedmann 15b, Horowitz-Rabin 50, Lauterbach, I, 111; B. Megillah 9a; Yer. ibid. i, 71d; Masseket Soferim 1. 7, ed. Higger 101, and parallel passages). Philo and Josephus, following the Septuagint, interpret the law against reviling God (Exodus 22. 28) as prohibiting also the mocking of pagan gods (Philo, Vita Mosis II (26) 205; De Spec. leg. I, 53; Josephus, Contra Ap. II, 257; Ant. IV, 207). In other parts of the ancient diaspora, the law was likewise interpreted in such a manner as to make for better relations with the pagan population. Thus Nahum of Media reduced the prohibition against commerce with idolaters during their festival season (Mishna Aboda Zara I, 1) to one day (B. ibid. 7b); Samuel of Nahardea maintained that in the diaspora the prohibition applied only to the very day of the idolatrous festival (ibid.). Samuel further held that the civil law of the State must be recognized by Jewish religious courts (Baba Kamma 113a). In the Middle Ages, the text of the prayer against sectarians was changed in several rites so as not to give offense to Christians (Elbogen, Der juedische Gottesdienst,[2] 1924, p. 51). Rabbenu Gershom's formal prohibition of plural marriage, long after the practice had disappeared among the Jews of western Europe, was probably influenced in part by a respect for the standards set by the Christian Church (see my remarks in Jewish Self-Government in the Middle Ages, 1924, p. 22). In modern times, many changes in the ritual have been proposed with a view to preventing misunderstanding of Judaism by the general population, as well as out of inner objection to anything which might appear to reflect dual allegiance, or a sense of superiority by Jews. For the changes introduced by Reform Jews, see Elbogen, op. cit., pp. 50, 54, et al., see Index, under Reformbewegung and Reformgebetbuecher; D. Philipson, The Reform Movement in Judaism, revised ed. 1931, pp. 75 ff.; et al., see Index under Prayer-Book.

It is possible that one of the changes in the oldest known synagogue ritual was made because of fear of giving offense to the Egyptian government. The Nash Papyrus (published by Stanley A. Cook, PSBA, XXV, 1903, pp. 34 ff.) is, as is well known, a remnant of an ancient prayer-book, and for this reason contains the Ten Commandments and the beginning of the Shema: i.e., a part of the most ancient liturgy used by the Jews (see Mishna Tamid 5. 1; cf. B. Berakot 12a; Yer. ibid. I, 8, 3c; Elbogen, Der juedische Gottesdienst, 24, 236, 242). As W. F. Albright has demonstrated, this papyrus probably dates from about the middle of the second century B.C. (Journal of Biblical Literature, LVI, 1937, 171 ff.). According to Albright, one of the differences between the text of the Nash Papyrus and that of the Masorah is due simply to apologetics. He explains the deviation between the text of the Nash Papyrus and the Masorah in regard to the fourth commandment as follows: "It is highly improbable that the Egyptian Jews of the Lagide period would dare use the Deuteronomic motivation" (for the observance of the sabbath, viz. "And thou shalt remember that thou wast a slave in the land of Egypt, and the Lord thy God brought thee out thence by a mighty hand and by an outstretched arm; therefore the Lord thy God commanded thee to keep the sabbath day"). Albright continues: "So we may simply regard the substitution of the other motivation (i.e., that of Exodus 20. 11) as a prudent political move."

In his particular instance, however, it seems to me more probable that the Egyptian Jews felt that some other motivation for the observance of the sabbath was needed for themselves. The reason for this was the fact that the benefits of the Exodus had to some extent been lost so far as they were concerned through their resettlement in Egypt. For this reason, as indicated in HTR, XXXI, 1938, p. 295, note 11, the Egyptian Jews omitted, in their version of M, the statement that Jacob came to Egypt "compelled by the Divine commandment." The statement seemed to reflect on the piety of the Jews living in Egypt. On the other hand, the author of the Book of Jubilees (regarding the date of which see Appendix, above), apparently having this passage of M in mind, stresses the fact that God commanded Jacob to go to Egypt (Jubilees 44. 6).

ADDITIONAL NOTE C

Afikoman

The rendering of the word *afikoman* and even the correct reading of the word are in some doubt. Among the recorded variants are: (*a*) *afikoman*, found in the current eds. of Babli, as well as in the Munich Manuscript, and Codex Adler 850 of Babli Pesahim in the

Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, in the text of the Mishna as found in Yerushalmi, in some editions and manuscripts of Aruk, in the Bacher manuscript of Maimonides' Commentary on the Mishna in the Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, in most of the extant rituals of the Passover Haggadah, in Tosefta, ed. pr. and Codex Vienna, as recorded by Zuckermandel in his edition p. 173; in ed. pr. and one manuscript of Mekilta, as recorded by Horowitz; Ca; E; (*b*) *afikmon*, found in Mishna ed. Lowe; in Enelow manuscript 348 of Maimonides' Commentary on the Mishna, in the Jewish Theological Seminary of America; in the reading of Rabbi Yehosef, recorded in Meleket Shelomoh on the Mishna, in Siddur R. Saadia (where, however, it is vocalized *afikemon*, and perhaps should be so read in the other texts), and in Codex Adler 2935, f. 4a (fragment of the Passover Haggadah); (*c*) *afikimon*, found in the Parma and Budapest manuscripts of the Mishna; as well as in the manuscript of the Mishna, Seder Moed, dated 1361, found in the Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America; in some editions of Aruk; in Codex Leyden of the Yerushalmi as recorded by S. Lieberman in Hayerushalmi Kifeshuto, p. 521; in Codex Adler 3130, f. 7, verso; in Tosefta, Codes Erfurt as recorded by Zuckermandel, loc. cit.; in C; O; P;Qa (for these sigla see note 1); and manuscripts cited by Italiener, op. cit., pp. 263 (oriental) and 268 (French); cf. also manuscript cited by him on p. 261; (*d*) *afikomin* or *afikomen*, found in Mishna as cited by Meleket Shelomoh; in the manuscript of Maimonides' Commentary on the Mishna, Zeraim and Moed (Miller Collection at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America); in the Constantinople edition of Mekilta; in Yerushalmi Pesahim 37d, line 53, ed. pr.; in F; G; H; M; (vocalized *afikomin*, but spelled without the *yod* before the *nun* in RW; vocalized *afikomen*, and lacking *yod* before *nun* in V; so also in ed. Mantua 1568 and the Darmstadt Manuscript of the Passover Haggadah, see Italiener, op. cit., p. 131, and cf. note 13; as well as p. 218); (*e*) *afikomon*, found in text of Mekilta, according to citation in Midrash Hakamim; in Yerushalmi Pesahim 37d, line 24, according to ed. pr. The meaning of the word has been in doubt at least since the third century of the Christian Era. Authorities of that period rendered it "dessert." But the general tendency among modern writers (including Loew, in his notes to S. Krauss, Griechische u. Lateinische Lehnwoerter s.v., II, p. 107; Ben Yehuda in his Dictionary (Thesaurus Totius Hebraitatis), I, p. 348, note 4; S. Lieberman, Hayerushalmi Kifeshuto, loc. cit., and Z. Carl, Pesahim, p. 89), is to associate the word with the post-prandial revelry, celebrated by going "from group to group" and arranging public entertainment. This practice seems to be referred to in the text of the *baraita*, as recorded in Yerushalmi, and also in the interpretation given to the passage in the Mishna by Rab (Babli Pesahim 119b).

ADDITIONAL NOTE D

The Tobiads

For the older literature regarding the Tobiads, see G. McL. Harper in Journal of American Philology, XLIX, 1928, pp. 7 ff. Other discussions of the Tobiads and their activities are to be found in E. Meyer, Ursprung u. Anfaenge d. Christentums, II, 128 ff.; Tscherikower, pp. 164 ff.; Tarbiz, IV, 1932–33, pp. 242 f. and 354 ff. and his Palestine under the Ptolemies, p. 39; Oesterley and Robinson, A History of Israel, II, 200, 208; Cambridge Ancient History, VII, 160, 193; VIII, 500 ff.; A. Momigliano, in Atti della R. Accademia d. scienze di Torino, LXVII, 1931–32, pp. 165 ff.; S. Zeitlin, Second Jewish Commonwealth (1933), pp. 12 ff.; C. Watzinger, Denkmaler Palaestinas (1935), pp. 13 ff.; S. W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews (1937), III, p. 33, n. 4; E. Bikerman, Institutions des Séleucides, pp. 171 ff.; F. M. Heichelheim, Wirtschaftsgeschichte d. Altertums (1938), p. 500; B. Meisler, in Tarbiz, XII (1941), pp. 109 ff.; M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World (see Index, under Tobiads, Tubias). With regard to the extent of the hellenization of the Tobiads, cf. the papyrus cited by Tscherikower, in Palestine under the Ptolemies (Mizraim, loc. cit., p. 53), where Tobias writes a letter to Apollonios and concludes with the usual pagan greeting in the name of "the gods." As Tscherikower remarks, "The plural in the mouth of a Jew" — we may add in the mouth of a Jew named *Tobiah*! — "is most significant; the fact that these words were written by a Greek secretary does not of course change the matter in any way." There are possibly, in addition to the material mentioned in these works, some references to the Tobiads in the later works of Scripture and the earlier Pseudepigrapha. In order to identify these references, it must be borne in mind that Nehemiah, and doubtless the later opponents of the Tobiads, maintained that that family was really of Ammonite descent, and not Judaite at all, though the Tobiads, themselves, appear to have insisted on their own Israelite background, and if we consider Menelaus one of them (see Additional Note E) apparently they considered themselves Benjaminites.

Once this fact is realized a new significance attaches to the remarkable statement in Jubilees 16. 8 9: "And he (i.e. Lot) and his daughters committed sin upon the earth, such as had not been on the earth since the days of Adam till his time. . . . And behold it is commanded and engraven concerning all his seed, on the heavenly tablets, *to remove them and root them out*, and to execute judgment upon them like the judgment of Sodom, and to leave no seed of the man on the earth on the day of condemnation." The fearful judgment would

in any event reflect a profound contemporary bitterness against Ammon and Moab (the descendants of Lot); when it is declared to be inscribed on the "heavenly tablets" it becomes particularly significant. For the writer of Jubilees generally described as engraven on the heavenly tablets only subjects which are matters of controversy in his own time (cf. the following passages dealing with subjects of sectarian controversies, Jubilees 3. 10, impurity after childbirth; 6. 17, the date of the Feast of Weeks; 16. 28–29, proper manner of observance of Feast of Tabernacles; etc.). It is especially noteworthy that the writer requires the "children of Lot" to be "removed," as though some of them at least were included within the family of Israel so that they had to be expelled, as a first step to their being "rooted out" and destroyed.

With this passage of the Book of Jubilees in mind, we may also find a special significance in the particular hostility to Ammon and Moab, characteristic of the Chronicles (and already noted by A. Geiger, Urschrift, pp. 49 ff.), as well as in the reference to the "children of Lot," in Psalm 83. 9. The Psalm describes a general attack on the Judaites by their neighbors, and enumerates them in vv. 7 ff. as follows: "The tents of Edom and the Ishmaelites, Moab and the Hagarites; Gebal and Ammon and Amalek; Philistia and the inhabitants of Tyre. Assyria also is joined with them, they have been an arm to the children of Lot." The trend of mind of the Psalmist seems confused, from a first reading of his text, in view of the fact that the Ammonites and Moabites, whom he mentions separately, are the "children of Lot." What he is trying to say becomes clear when we recognize that "Assyria" or *Asshur* is here, as so often in texts of this period, a cypher for the Seleucid empire. If we take the "sons of Lot" to refer to the Tobiad clan, the meaning of the whole passage becomes clear. The Psalmist enumerates the enemies of Israel. He notes with dismay that the Seleucid government has become associated with the ancient enemies of Israel; all these enemies have now become an arm for the Tobiads.

The Psalmist, then, is describing an alliance of the various Palestinian nationalities, which with the assistance of the imperial government "have become an arm for the children of Lot" or the Tobiads. To what time does this psalm refer? It is usually assumed (so Kittel) that this psalm refers to the events described in I Maccabees, chapter 5, when the neighbors of Judaea undertook to attack Judah the Maccabee. But the description of a similar joint attack of Edomites, Ammonites, Moabites, etc., on Jacob and his children in Jubilees chapters 37–38 suggests such alliances of Judaea's neighbors against it were not unusual. Indeed, the Chronicler projects a similar attack on Judah into the days of Jehoshaphat (II Chronicles 20). In view of the growing body of opinion placing the Book of Jubilees in

pre-Maccabean times (see Appendix, below) it may be suggested that Psalm 83 also describes a union of the neighbors of Judaea against it preceding that which took place after the initial victories of Judah the Maccabee. Indeed, this would seem likely because of the use of cyphers for the Tobiads and for the Seleucids. If this were a period of open rebellion, presumably a follower of Judah the Maccabee would not need to feel restrained in praying against the enemies of the Jews. We should also expect that a psalmist writing after the profanation of the Temple by Antiochus IV would consider that event the focus of the war, and not simply an incident in the rivalry between the clans and nationalities of Palestine with one another. The tone of the Psalm, with its reference to the support given by Assyria to the "children of Lot," suggests a period before the Maccabean rebellion, and after the conquest of Palestine by the Seleucids.

The Psalmist may well have in mind such a situation as arose when Jason tried to reconquer Jerusalem from its Tobiad masters, and was driven out by the forces of Antiochus IV. As this occasion is described in II Maccabees 5. 5, it may well have seemed to a contemporary a struggle of the surrounding Palestinian nationalities to destroy Judaea, and to enforce on it the government of the Tobiads, who now had the support also of Assyria or Antiochus IV.

ADDITIONAL NOTE E

The Family of the High Priest Menelaus

Menelaus is described as the brother of Simon (II Maccabees 4. 23) and Simon is described as a Benjaminite (ibid. 3. 4). The suggestion (originally made by L. Herzfeld, Geschichte d. Volkes Israel, 1855, I, 218) which has been widely accepted that the word *Beniamein* in the current Greek texts is either a translator's or a copyist's error for *miyamin*, is indeed brilliant and ingenious. According to this, Simon and Menelaus would turn out to be not members of the tribe of Benjamin, and therefore non-priests, but of the family of *Miyamin*, one of the twenty-four priestly families (I Chronicles 24. 9, *et al.*). It is, however, entirely improbable that this theory is correct. Among the reasons which must be urged against it is the fact that one of the sources used by Josephus, in its effort to transform Menelaus into a priest (so as to avoid the suggestion that a non-Aaronid ever served in the capacity of High Priest), is forced to adopt the device of making him a son of Simeon the Righteous, and a bearer of the name Onias (Josephus, Antiquities XII, 239 (5. 1)). Probably this impossible reconstruction of the family background of Menelaus was intended by its perpetrators to prevent Herod or his successors from appealing to the case of Menelaus as a precedent for appointing another non-

Aaronid to the High Priesthood. But if Menelaus had been a priest. this violence to the historical facts would have been quite superfluous, Curiously enough, some texts of II Maccabees try to achieve the same end, of making Menelaus into a priest, by reading *Balgea* (see D. de Bruyne-B. Sodar, Les anciennes Traductions Latines des Machabées, 1932, ad loc.), which was also a priestly family (I Chronicles 24. 14) instead of *Beniamein*. This reading is accepted by E. Bickermann (Der Gott d. Makkabaeer, p. 66), and is given some consideration by A. Kahana in his Hebrew translation of II Maccabees (see A. Kahana, Ha-Sefarim Ha-Hizzonim, ad loc.). But it is probably not to be accepted. The copyists who introduced this change were apparently, like Josephus' source and the modern historians who would emend *Beniamein* into *Miyamin*, disconcerted by the suggestion that a non-Aaronid could have been imposed as High Priest without armed resistance by the Jews. The fact is, of course, that in the pre-Maccabean era the priesthood had become corrupt; and even among those who observed the Law many did so half-heartedly. Hence it happened, for example, that a man who was undoubtedly a direct descendant of Simeon the Righteous — indeed, either his son or his grandson — actually set up a Temple for sacrificial purposes outside of Jerusalem, despite the repeated biblical injunctions prohibiting such a practice. A generation which could see the establishment of a Temple at Heliopolis could also witness the service of a non-Aaronid as priest, without the resentment which would doubtless have been caused through such an appointment in a later age. For a further discussion of the whole subject see, besides the literature already cited, the following: A. Buechler, Die Tobiaden und die Oniaden (VI. Jahresbericht d. israelitisch-theologischen Lehranstalt in Wien) 1899, 9 ff.; Schuerer, I, 195, note 28; J. Klausner, Historia Yisrealit², I (1919), p. 284; E. Meyer, II, 133; W. Kolbe, Beitraege z. syrischen u. juedischen geschichte, 1926, p. 151; Tscherikower, 197; S. Zeitlin, A History of the Second Jewish Commonwealth, 1933, p. 19; A. Kahana's Commentary on II Maccabees (Tel Aviv, 1937, ad loc.); R. H. Charles, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Daniel, 1929, pp. 246 ff. See also J. Wellhausen, who (Israelit. u. jued. Geschichte, 1921, p. 236) suggests that Menelaus and Simon were Tobiads, apparently in the sense that they were sons of Joseph ben Tobiah. This suggestion has won wide acceptance, and is indeed supported by Josephus, War, I, 31 ff. Nevertheless the possibility remains that they were *followers* of the Tobiads or distant members of the clan, rather than sons of Joseph.

ADDITIONAL NOTE F

The Original Text of Dayyenu

The phrase, "and appointed a High Priest for us," occurs only in one text of the Passover Haggadah, so far as I have been able to find, namely a Genizah fragment in the Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, Codex Adler 3214, f. 4 recto. Unfortunately this fragment is torn, so that it contains only the last few lines of Db, beginning with the words "and gave us their substance." But it is obvious that if Db included a reference to the appointment of a high priest, Da must have contained such a reference as well; and we may therefore take it that the manuscript from which this fragment derives, contained such a strophe, as is indicated above under IIIe (above, p. 2). It requires little consideration to realize that although this reading is unique, it represents an older tradition than those of the other texts, which have no reference to the appointment of a high priest. Certainly no one would have added such a reference after the destruction of the Temple; while it may well be argued that communities finding mention of a high priest in their text of D would omit it in view of the fact that no such office now exists. It is possible to express gratitude to God for the establishment of His Temple, even though it is now waste; for the institution rather than any particular building is made the subject of thankfulness. It is not possible to speak of gratitude to God for the appointment of a high priest, when there is no such officer in existence. Moreover, the phrase "to atone for all our sins" follows more logically after such an expression as "appointed a high priest for us" than after mention of the Temple. Finally, it is probable, *a priori*, that Da consisted of fifteen strophes, corresponding to the fifteen steps in the Temple, and to the fifteen pilgrim psalms (120–134). This last argument is strengthened by the observation that in certain rituals, such as those represented by Q, Qa, V, Vb (for these sigla, see Note 1, above) and the text cited by Italiener, in Die Darmstaedter Pessach-Haggadah, p. 280, end Da with two references to the sanctuary. All but the last of these texts read:

> Had He brought us into the land of Israel,
> And not built us the holy Temple,
> It had sufficed us!
>
> Had He built us the Holy Temple,
> And not built us the Chosen House,
> It had sufficed us!

The text cited by Italiener differs from the others only in reversing the order, mentioning the Chosen House before the Holy Temple. This curious redundancy is explained by the commentators (see

Shibbale Ha-Leket, loc. cit.) as an effort to include a reference to the sanctuary at Shiloh (Joshua 18. 1), though that was a temporary sanctuary, before referring to the permanent sanctuary in Jerusalem, which is called "the Chosen Temple." More probably, the redundancy is the result of a conflation of two variant readings, both referring in different terms to the same institution, namely the Temple. Yet the conflation, by its very curiosity, suggests that the persons responsible for it felt the need of adding a fifteenth strophe to Da; and this need may have been felt particularly because of the omission of the older reference to the high priest. It should be noted, however, that many texts seem to have contained only a reference to the *Bet Ha-Mikdash* ("the Holy Temple") and none to the *Bet Ha-Behirah* ("the Chosen Temple"). The "Holy Temple" is mentioned in the texts cited by Italiener on pp. 131, 176, 182, 194, 209, 219, all said to be of German origin; and also in the following E, F, G, H, P, R, Sa, Sb, Sc, Sd, Va, X; the term "Chosen Temple" is found in the texts cited by Italiener on pp. 170, 199, 213, 229, 233, 244, all these being of German origin; 263, (oriental) and B, C, Ca, O, Tb, U, W. At any rate, this seems to have been the reading of Abrabanel, according to his commentary (though the reading of the text has been "corrected" to correspond to that of the usual Passover Haggadah), of Kol Bo, and of Abudarham. The reading *Bet Ha-Behirah* seems, however, to have been the original; for it alone occurs in the final paragraph of D according to *all* texts. This fact indicates that wherever any reference to *Bet Ha-Mikdash* occurs in D, that is the result of some alteration of the text. This suggests that what happened was the insertion of a reference to *Bet Ha-Mikdash* in order to take the place of the omitted reference to the High Priest; and that the redundancy led to the omission of the reference to *Bet Ha-Behirah* according to many texts.

It is further to be remarked that in the fragment containing the reference to the high priest, D ends with the words "May it be rebuilt in our days!" Obviously these words refer to the Temple, which is, however, removed from them by the whole phrase referring to the high priest. Presumably, the words were not inserted immediately after the mention of the Temple because that would have involved an alteration in the traditional text.

ADDITIONAL NOTE G

The Expression *Ha-Kadosh Baruk Hu* ("The Holy One, blessed be He")

The phrase, *ha-kadosh baruk hu*, "The Holy One, blessed be He," should more correctly be read, *ha-kodesh baruk hu*, "The Holiness, blessed be He," and it occurs in that form in most early manuscripts,

both of the Passover Haggadah and also in other Rabbinic texts, and sometimes simply as *ha-kodesh*, "The Holiness" (cf. M. Friedmann, note on Sifra debe Rab, 1915, p. 30). This form is analogous to that occurring in *ha-geburah*, "The Power," instead of *ha-gibbor*, "The Mighty One." The Aramaic form *kudsha berik hu* in the *kaddish* is the literal translation of the *ha-kodesh baruk hu*, and thus demonstrates further that that is the correct and original form of the title. Virtually all the rituals agree in reading *ha-makom* in B and D; and *ha-kadosh* (*ha-kodesh*) *baruk hu* in A and M. This is true of all the texts cited by Italiener in Die Darmstaedter Pessach-Haggadah and of the following additional texts: C, Ca (both of which, however, add *baruk hu* after *ha-makom*), D, E, F, G, H, I, O, P, Q, Qa, R, Sa, Sb, V, W, and X (regarding these sigla, see note 1). T contains only the beginning of the Passover Haggadah, and in that part follows the usual text. M contains only passage B, and there follows the usual text. U reads *hamakom* in B and D; and *ha-kodesh*, in abbreviated form (the first two letters, followed by an apostrophe) in A and M. (The use of this abbreviation for *ha-kodesh* is, of course, quite common. See, for example, the reading of *Yalkut* as recorded in my edition of Sifre, Deuteronomy 5, variants to page 13, line 6; and the reading of the Oxford Ms. recorded in the same edition 19, variants to page 31, line 4. In Ginze Schechter I, page 28, Professor L. Ginzberg maintains that this abbreviation stands, in the particular text published there, for *elohim*; but I am not sure that his argument in this respect is cogent. It seems to me probable that the abbreviation in that text, too, stands for *ha-kodesh*). Siddur Rab Saadia Gaon reads, like the other rituals, *ha-kodesh baruk hu* in the following passage of M, "*And the Lord brought us forth from Egypt*, Not by means of an angel, nor by means of a seraph, nor by means of a messenger; but the Holy One, blessed be He, etc." In the appendix to M, which, according to most rituals, reads: "These are the ten plagues which the Holy One, blessed be He, brought upon the Egyptians," Siddur Rab Saadia read *ha-makom baruk hu* instead of *ha-kadosh baruk hu*. It also reads *ha-makom baruk hu* instead of *ha-kadosh baruk hu* in A, where it replaces the usual formula, "Now if the Holy One, blessed be He, had not brought forth our ancestors from Egypt," with the following, "Now if the Omnipresent (*ha-makom*), blessed be He, had not *redeemed* our ancestors from Egypt, etc." (The substitution of *redeemed* for *brought forth* was perhaps intended to meet the needs of the Egyptian Jews who were still in that land, and could not be described as "brought forth" from there.) This reading of A is also found in the following Genizah texts: Nb, Nj, Nn. Genizah text Nf contains the appendix to M in the same form as the Siddur Rab Saadia. The text of J, too, appears to resemble the Siddur Rab Saadia in its reading of A. K XII omits the

mention of the Deity in this passage. The other texts published by I. Abrahams in Jewish Quarterly Review, X, 41 ff. do not contain A. So far as they contain the passages found in the extant rituals, they seem to follow the usual differentiation between the use of *ha-kodesh* and *ha-makom*. K IV, VII, X, which contain the appendix to M, all read *ha-makom* there, like Siddur Rab Saadia.

This consistency among all the extant texts is singular indeed, in view of the fact that a study of almost any other Rabbinic text will show endless confusion between the use of *ha-makom* and *ha-kadosh* among the copyists, as though the copyists felt free to use the terms interchangeably. It appears therefore that the usage of the Passover Haggadah regarding these terms of appellation for the Deity was well fixed by tradition. The fact that AM, the earlier parts of the Passover Haggadah, seem to prefer the term *ha-kodesh baruk hu*, while BD, half a century younger, prefer the term *ha-makom* may have some bearing on the history of the development of the two terms and their relation to one another. But this cannot be determined without further study. If the dates given to A, B, D, and M in the present study are accepted, they would constitute the earliest texts containing these terms of appellation for the Deity.

THE TECHNIQUE OF EXORCISM

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In the curious collection of lapidary and magical lore known as the Kyranides directions are given for making a ring with certain special virtues.[1] The stone is to be *νεμεσίτης*, which is explained as a name given to a stone chipped from an altar of Nemesis made of *λίθος κραταιός*. We can only translate those words as "hard stone," but the expression seems to be a technical term for a particular stone which we cannot identify. Upon such a stone a figure of Nemesis is to be carved; she is represented as a maiden resting her foot upon a wheel, holding in her left hand a cubit-rule (*πῆχυς*), in her right a twig (*ῥάβδος*).[2] The writer concludes, *ἐὰν οὖν τὸν δακτύλιον τοῦτον προσενέγκῃς δαιμονιζομένῳ, παραῦτα ὁ δαίμων ἐξομολογήσας ἑαυτὸν φεύξεται.* These words are the occasion for this paper; but before proceeding to discuss them, something should be said about the design prescribed in the passage.

Representations of Nemesis are very common in Graeco-Roman art, and the attributes of the goddess need not long occupy our attention.[3] The wheel, which Nemesis shares with Tyche, is a symbol of changing fortune; sometimes a griffin with a paw resting on the wheel accompanies the goddess, sometimes the animal is a symbol, a kind of hieroglyph, as Perdrizet

[1] Mély-Ruelle, Les lapidaires de l'antiquité et du moyen âge: tome II, Les lapidaires grecs, p. 31, N 5–11. A somewhat different text, attributed to Harpocration, was published by Pitra, Anal. Sacr. et Class. V, 2, p. 297. There the *νεμεσίτης* stone is said to have been built (*κατεσκευασμένος*) into a temple of Nemesis, and parts of the associated bird and plant are to be placed under the ring-stone.

[2] The coins and gems show that *ῥάβδος* here means twig, not staff. Cf. also Hermas, Shepherd, Sim. 8. 1. Volkmann (Arch. Rel. Wiss. XXXI, 66), who thinks that a magical wand is meant, overlooks the fact that in a gem-cutting showing Nemesis with rule and wand the two objects would be indistinguishable.

[3] On Nemesis, see H. Posnansky, Nemesis und Adrasteia (Breslauer Philol. Abhandl. V, 2), 1890, and the articles by O. Rossbach in Roscher and H. Herter in Pauly-Wissowa; also P. Perdrizet, Némésis (Bull. Corr. Hell. XXXVI [1912], 248–274), and Volkmann, ARW XXVI, 296–321, XXXI, 57–76. Nemesis was invoked as a protector against the evil eye: Plin. N. H. 28. 22, cf. Wolters, Notes on Antique Folklore on the basis of Plin. N. H. 28. 22–29, pp. 31–34.

puts it, for the goddess herself.[4] The twig seems to have no symbolic relation to the nature of the goddess; as used in ritual lustration, it might be given to various deities.[5] For the cubit-rule an epigram of the Anthologia Planudea (4. 224) gives us an adequate explanation:

ἡ Νέμεσις πῆχυν κατέχω· τίνος οὕνεκα λέξεις.
πᾶσι παραγγέλλω, "μηδὲν ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρον."

It is worth noting that representations of Nemesis holding both the twig and the cubit-rule are rare. Posnansky, who has collected the archaeological data with great care, does not call attention to this combination of attributes, though he discusses others, such as wheel and bridle, wheel and twig, etc. However, Nemesis has both rule and twig on two coins listed by Posnansky.[6]

Attention may also be called to the fact that *νεμεσίτης* is certainly no ordinary lapidary term. The compiler of the Kyranides has probably coined it to fit his system, which is, briefly, as follows. Under each letter of the alphabet there are grouped names of four things, all beginning with that letter, and each representing one of the four elements — a stone, a bird, a plant, and a fish (stone representing fire). Then follow magical recipes in which one of the four is used, sometimes two or three, sometimes all. They are represented either by actual parts of the four objects or by pictorial designs, as when a bird is carved on a stone. Under N, besides the *νεμεσίτης* stone, we find *νῆσσα*, duck, a plant called *νεκύα*, a fish called *ναυκράτης*. The last two seem to have as little authority in popular usage as the name of the stone, and they may be esoteric names, for such were freely used in magic and alchemy; *νεκύα* is said to be the same as *φλόμος*, mullein, and *ναυκράτης* is more commonly called *ἐχενηΐς*.

This article deals with the words *ὁ δαίμων ἐξομολογήσας ἑαυτὸν φεύξεται*. J. Tambornino [7] gathered together a mass of material bearing upon demonic possession, drawing upon both pagan

[4] Perdrizet, op. cit., 261.

[5] Posnansky, op. cit., 111.

[6] Commodus, Pamphylia (Attaleia), Mionnet, Descr. des Médailles. Suppl. Vol. VII, p. 34, no. 43. Philippus senior, Moesia Inf. (Callatia), Suppl. Vol. II, p. 62, no. 55.

[7] Julius Tambornino, De antiquorum daemonismo, 1909 (RGVV VII, 3).

and Christian literature; yet, although his collections include several passages from the Kyranides, this one was overlooked. As we shall see later, Christian texts often tell of demons forced to confess themselves under compulsion from an exorcist; but the Kyranides is not a Christian writing.[8] Taken in connection with other narratives of exorcism that sentence emphasizes an aspect of the exorcist's art which is illustrated in the acts of various wonder-workers, whether mere magicians, philosophers, or religious leaders, and which, though not unnoticed, has not been adequately emphasized. The following treatment of the point is intended merely to supplement Tambornino's work; and most of the examples used were collected by his industry, not mine.

Briefly, the point that seems to need further attention is this: the exorcist's work is most thoroughly and effectively carried out when the demon does not merely leave the possessed person, but before doing so is compelled to do one or more of the following things: (1) to speak in answer to the operator's conjurations; (2) to tell his name or at least his nature, i.e. the class of demons to which he belongs, and to describe the kind of mischief that he is wont to do. To all this there is sometimes added (3) a visible proof, in the form of some violent action, that the possessing force was actually a demon, and that he has left his former abode in the body of his victim. This act is sometimes required by the exorcist, as a proof of his control; sometimes the narratives represent it as an act of wicked spite on the part of the demon. These points should be examined in order.

1. *The demon must speak.*[9] Thus in Papyri Graec. Mag. XIII, 242–4 (Preisendanz), there is a recipe, ἐὰν δαιμονιζομένῳ εἴπῃς τὸ ὄνομα προσάγων τῇ ῥινὶ αὐτοῦ θεῖον καὶ ἄσφαλτον, εὐθέως λαλήσεται καὶ ἀπελεύσεται; the treatment might well wring at least a murmur of protest from the most taciturn. Again in the "tried and tested" (δόκιμον) recipe of Pibeches for treatment of demoniacs (PGM IV 3007 ff.) one part of the exorcism (3038 ff.) is ὁρκίζω σε πᾶν πνεῦμα δαιμόνιον λαλῆσαι ὁποῖον καὶ ἂν

[8] The name Jesus Christ occurs once (p. 23, Θ 7), but merely as a name of power in a charm, where it is introduced as a διονυσιακὸν ὄνομα.

[9] Mark 1. 34 is an exception. There Jesus does not allow the demons to speak "because they knew him." Apparently he did not wish his nature and mission to be revealed prematurely.

ἧς, ὅτι ὁρκίζω σε κατὰ τῆς σφραγῖδος, ἧς ἔθετο Σολομὼν ἐπὶ τὴν γλῶσσαν τοῦ Ἰηρεμίου, καὶ ἐλάλησεν. Here the allusion to the effect of the seal of Solomon (καὶ ἐλάλησεν) makes it plain that the purpose of this clause is simply to make the demon speak; it is an error, I think, to treat the indefinite relative clause introduced by ὁποῖον as if it were an indirect question asking the name and nature of the demon; such an interpretation runs counter to syntactic usage even in the period of the papyri.[10] The purpose of the clause is simply to make sure of the demon, whatever his name. The same indefinite relative clause appears again in lines 3041 and 3045, and with the same purpose.

The recipe contains several allusions to Hebrew history and rabbinical tradition which are accurate enough to suggest a Jewish origin for the text; on the other hand there are some things that do not agree well with Jewish teaching. The anachronistic connection of Solomon with Jeremiah may not be very significant; but if the author was a Jew, it is surprising to find the name Jesus, followed by several magical words or names, immediately after the phrase ὁρκίζω σε κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν Ἑβραίων (l. 3020). In such close juxtaposition it is natural to take Ἰησοῦ in apposition with θεοῦ, but it may be the whole series of *nomina sacra*, rather than Ἰησοῦ alone, that is to be connected with τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν Ἑβραίων. In any case, one would not expect an orthodox Jew to use the name Jesus; yet magic never conforms to the orthodox doctrine of any religion, and A. D. Nock (Gnomon, 1936, 607, 2) reminds us of the sons of the high priest Scaeva who cast out demons in the name of Jesus (Acts 19. 13 f.). W. L. Knox ("Jewish Liturgical Exorcism," HTR XXXI, 191–203) believes that genuine Jewish formulas were conflated by a heathen compiler. I find it as easy to believe that all the Hebrew lore was "got up," perhaps with the aid of a renegade Jew, by a Gentile master of magic — somewhat as pretended theosophists have been known to make great play with the language of Indian yoga. To me the last sentence (3084 ff.) sounds much more like what a Gentile pretending to

[10] Yet it was accepted by Deissmann, Licht vom Osten, 223, n. 8, by Klostermann in his note on Mark 5. 9 (Das Markusevang., in Lietzmann's Handbuch), and by Lagrange on Luke 8. 30 (L'évangile selon Saint Luc).

possess Jewish learning would say than what a Jew would say of his own religion and its history.[10a]

Besides these passages there are others in which it may be plausibly conjectured that the silence of the demon presents a special obstacle to the exorcist. Into this group fall some of those descriptions of Jesus' miracles in which the dumbness of the victim is mentioned (Matthew 9. 32–33, 12. 22; Mark 9. 25). It is natural to say, as many commentators do, that the dumbness is an effect of the disease, and is imputed to the demon that causes the affliction; but Lagrange, in his commentary on Mark 9. 17, after remarking upon this and other explanations, continues: ". . . il suffit d'entendre ἄλαλον du démon lui-même, qui refuse à parler. C'est une difficulté de plus pour l'exorciser, car on ne sait comment le prendre." Immediately after the command of Jesus, the demon cries out, throws the boy into a convulsion, and leaves him. That the idea of a dumb demon was sufficiently familiar in popular thought appears clearly from a passage which Wetstein and later commentators have cited in connection with Mark 9. 25; it is Plutarch de defectu orac. 438 B. There Plutarch tells of an occasion when the Pythia was prevailed upon to enter the oracular chamber when the omens, at first unfavorable, had been brought to a more favorable appearance only after a long and importunate series of trials; she entered, according to report, ἄκουσα καὶ ἀπρόθυμος, εὐθὺς δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας ἀποκρίσεις ἦν καταφανὴς οὐκ ἀναφέρουσα, δίκην νεὼς ἐπειγομένης, ἀλάλου καὶ κακοῦ πνεύματος οὖσα πλήρης. To this Bauer (Wörterbuch, s.v. ἄλαλος) adds a passage from a Paris MS. (2316) cited by Reitzenstein (Poim. 293, 1), where ἄλαλα πνεύματα are mentioned.[11] Origen (Hom. in Jos. 24. 1) has a sentence which may, though indirectly, reflect the same idea: *si . . . adhibeantur autem multae orationes, multa ieiunia, multae*

[10a] A. Dieterich argued strongly in 1891 in favor of the view that the passage under discussion was taken over from a prayer of the Essenes or the Therapeutae (Abraxas, 137–148); Reitzenstein, writing thirteen years later, seems to doubt the Jewish origin of the prayer in spite of the names and incidents drawn from the Septuagint (Poimandres, 14, with notes 1 and 2).

[11] In a passage cited by Tambornino (52 f.) Psellus (de operat. daem. 13) says that a demon of the subterranean kind that hates the light has no faculty of reason, hence hears no words spoken and fears no rebuke; consequently he is often rightly called ἄλαλον καὶ κωφόν.

exorcistarum invocationes, et ad haec omnia surdus daemon in obsesso corpore permaneat, etc. Here the immediate nexus of *surdus* is with the preceding prepositional phrase; yet the obstinate refusal of the demon to yield to the prayers and invocations of the exorcist implies silence.

2. *The demon tells his name, or his nature and his evil works.* The belief that knowledge of a name gives a hold upon its owner is so well known to students of folklore and of the history of religion that it is unnecessary to offer evidence for it. From the tale of Rumpelstilzkin in Grimm's Märchen to the magical papyri, in which the adept vaunts his knowledge of secret names that control both demons and gods, proofs beyond number show how widely this idea prevailed. It seems to appear in Mark's vivid narrative about the Gerasene demoniac (5. 1–20).

In this episode, after much stormy discussion, the critics of the last half century have recognized several marks of the popular tale of wonder-working. Thus when the demon (after the command to leave the tormented man, cf. ἔλεγεν γάρ, verse 8) says to Jesus, ὁρκίζω σε τὸν θεόν, μή με βασανίσῃς, he seems to be using, as if ironically, a form of words better suited to an exorcist — "ce qui est d'une assez piquante naïveté," as Loisy remarks.[12] Again, to commentators who interpret the passage in the light of psychological therapeutics, Jesus' question, "What is thy name?" is a means of recalling the aberrant mind to an awareness of its own personality; so Plummer on Luke 8. 30 and Gould on this passage of Mark.[13] But those who consider the passage as historians of religion are content to note that knowledge of the name gives the exorcist a more complete control over the recalcitrant spirit; such was the view of Wellhausen and Loisy, and the point has been accepted more recently by Klostermann, Lagrange, and Creed.[14] The demon's reply to the demand for his name may also betray an element of folk-narrative. The answer "Legion," instead of an actual name, may be a mischievous evasion; so it is taken by Wellhausen and Lagrange, the latter remarking "véritable plaisanterie diabolique."

[12] A. Loisy, L'évangile selon Saint Marc, 153.

[13] Both commentaries belong to the International Critical Commentary series.

[14] J. Wellhausen, Das Evangelium Marci², 39; Loisy, Klostermann, Lagrange, as previously cited; Creed, The Gospel according to St. Luke (8. 30).

Bultmann, as reported by Klostermann, took it to be a mere boast.

It is worth noting that an exorcist may compensate for his ignorance of a demon's name by using a general clause, as in Pap. Graec. Mag. IV. 1239 ff., *ἐξορκίζω σε δαῖμον, ὅστις ποτ' οὖν εἶ*, and in Peter's words (Actus Petri cum Simone, 11), "Et tu itaque, quicumque es daemon," etc.

The Greek writings that treat of Solomon as the great master of magic who controls all demons and spirits were not accessible in modern text editions when Tambornino's work was done, and he makes no use of them.[15] They illustrate the importance of the name in more than one passage. In the *περὶ τοῦ Σολομῶντος* (*sic*) 3. 6, after the demons had all been summoned by the power of Solomon's seal, the narrative continues, *καὶ ἠρώτα ἓν ἕκαστον ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν δαιμόνων τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν ἐργασίαν καὶ ὑπὸ ποίου τῶν ἁγίων ἀγγέλων καταργεῖται.*[16] In the Testament of Solomon the examination of the demons is narrated in detail. Ornias, who later becomes Solomon's messenger to the other demons, is made to tell his name, his abiding place among the signs of the zodiac, the nature of his mischievous work, the form in which he manifests himself, and the name of the angel who is able to defeat him (2. 1–4); and in the examination of the demons, the spirits of the vices, and the thirty-six decans (chapters 3–18), the procedure is similar; each malefactor tells his name, his misdeeds, and the influence that counteracts him.[17] In the Acts of Thomas (31–32) the apostle addresses a demon in serpent form, saying "Tell me of what seed and of what race thou art. And he said unto him: I am a reptile of the reptile nature and noxious son of the noxious father of him that hurt and smote the four brethren that stood upright: I am son to him that sitteth on a throne over all the earth,"[18] and so on in a long succession of clauses beginning *ἐγώ εἰμι*, which seem like a diabolical parody of such passages as Melito, Homily on the Passion 101–104, or to take a pagan example, the Praises of Isis.[19]

[15] See C. C. McCown, The Testament of Solomon, 1922.

[16] Ibid., p. 91*.

[17] Ibid., p. 13* f., 16*–59*.

[18] M. R. James's translation in The Apocryphal New Testament, 379.

[19] W. Peek, Der Isishymnus von Andros und verwandte Texte, esp. the inscriptions of Ios and Kyme, pp. 122–125.

It is in connection with such passages as these that the answers of demons are described by the verbs ὁμολογῶ, *confiteor*, as in the charm from the Kyranides with which this paper began. After Apollonius of Tyana had detected and exposed the Lamia, or Empusa, who had seduced the young Menippus, δακρύοντι ἐῴκει τὸ φάσμα, καὶ ἐδεῖτο μὴ βασανίζειν αὐτό, μηδὲ ἀναγκάζειν ὁμολογεῖν ὅ τι εἴη. As Apollonius insists, she acknowledges that she is an Empusa, and that she had lured the youth on meaning in the end to devour him.[20] Again, when the mother of a demoniac boy decides to go to the Indian sages for help, ἐξηγόρευσεν ἑαυτὸν ὁ δαίμων ὑποκρίτῃ χρώμενος τῷ παιδί.[21] The demon, who is the ghost of a man slain in battle, then tells how, after his wife had consoled herself for his loss with unseemly haste, he had transferred his affections to the boy and taken possession of his body.[22]

Several passages in the church writers show it was a regular and expected part of a successful exorcism that an expelled demon should acknowledge his nature and evil works.

Minuc. Felix 27. 5–7: Haec omnia sciunt pleraque pars vestrum ipsos daemonas de semetipsis confiteri, quotiens a nobis tormentis verborum et orationis incendiis de corporibus exiguntur. Ipse Saturnus et Serapis et Iuppiter et quicquid daemonum colitis victi dolore quod sunt eloquuntur; nec utique in turpitudinem sui nonnullis praesertim vestrum assistentibus mentiuntur. Ipsis testibus esse eos daemonas credite fassis.

Theoph. ad Autol. 2. 8 *ad fin.*: . . . εἰ καὶ οἱ δαιμονῶντες ἐνίοτε καὶ μέχρι τοῦ δεῦρο ἐξορκίζονται κατὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ ὄντος θεοῦ καὶ ὁμολογεῖ αὐτὰ τὰ πλάνα πνεύματα εἶναι δαίμονες, κτλ.

Lactantius, Div. inst. 2. 16: Iustos autem, id est cultores dei, metuunt, cuius nomine de corporibus excedunt, quorum

[20] Philostr. Vit. Apoll. 4. 25 (166).

[21] Philostr. Vit. Apoll. 3. 28 (128); for ἐξαγορεύω = ὁμολογῶ, cf. LXX, Lev. 5. 5.

[22] In Luc. Philops. 16, "the Syrian from Palestine, known for his skill in these matters," is reputed to ask the demon who has taken possession of a man whence he came into the body of the sufferer; and the demon tells how and whence he came, speaking Greek or the language of the country from which he had come. An allusion to the miracles of Jesus or one of the apostles has been suspected; see the notes on this passage in the editions of Hemsterhuys and Lehmann.

verbis tamquam flagris verberati non modo daemones se esse confitentur, sed etiam nomina sua edunt . . . Cf. 5. 22, . . . interroganti qui sint, quando venerint, quomodo in homines irrepserint, confitentur; also Tert. de anima 57, Cypr. ad Donat. 5.

3. *The demon marks his departure by an act of physical violence.* Josephus (Ant. Jud. 8. 45–48) tells how God permitted Solomon to learn the art of controlling demons and freeing men from their attacks by means of charms and exorcisms. This art persisted to the writer's own day, and he gives an example of it in the cures worked by a certain Eleazar in the presence of Vespasian and his court. He describes the procedure as follows: Eleazar applied to the nostrils of the demon-possessed man his own ring, which had under its seal-stone one of the roots whose properties Solomon had taught, and so drew the demon out through the sufferer's nose. The man immediately fell to the ground, and Eleazar then adjured the demon never to return, calling the name of Solomon and reciting the charms that he had composed. Then this significant passage:

> *βουλόμενος δὲ πεῖσαι καὶ παραστῆσαι τοῖς παρατυγχάνουσιν ὁ Ἐλεάζαρος ὅτι ταύτην ἔχει τὴν ἰσχύν, ἐτίθει μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἤτοι ποτήριον πλῆρες ὕδατος ἢ ποδόνιπτρον, καὶ τῷ δαιμονίῳ προσέταττεν ἐξιὸν τἀνθρώπου ταῦτα ἀνατρέψαι καὶ παρασχεῖν ἐπιγνῶναι τοῖς ὁρῶσιν ὅτι καταλέλοιπε τὸν ἄνθρωπον.*

Here it is clear that the operator places the vessel of water to be upset merely as a means of showing that he has had the power to expel the demon. The same motive is present in one of Apollonius' wonder-cures (4. 20 [157–8]). A dissolute young man laughs rudely when Apollonius is explaining his idea of the proper way to pour libations. The sage at once declares that the youth is possessed, and sternly addresses the demon, bidding him *ξὺν τεκμηρίῳ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.* The demon replies, *"τὸν δεῖνα" ἔφη "καταβαλῶ ἀνδριάντα", δείξας τινὰ τῶν περὶ τὴν βασίλειον στόαν, πρὸς ἣ ταῦτα ἐπράττετο· ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ἀνδριὰς ὑπεκινήθη πρῶτον, εἶτα ἔπεσε, τὸν μὲν θόρυβον τὸν ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ὡς ἐκρότησαν ὑπὸ θαύματος τί ἄν τις γράφοι;*

Here the phrase ξὺν τεκμηρίῳ shows that Apollonius, like Eleazar, demanded a physical proof that the demon had actually left the afflicted body. A miracle attributed to Peter in the apocryphal Actus Petri cum Simone (11) closely resembles the story about Apollonius. As Peter concludes his prayer for the newly converted Marcellus, he sees a man in the crowd smiling, and commands him to stand forth. Thereupon the young man shows by his wild behavior and utterances that he is possessed by a demon, and Peter says: "*Et tu quoque, quicumque es daemon, in nomine domini nostri Iesus Christi exi a iuvene nihil nocens eum; ostende te omnibus adstantibus.*" *Hoc audito iuvenis expulit se, et statuam magnam marmoream quae in atrio domus posita erat adpraehendens, eam calcibus comminuit. Erat enim statua Caesaris.*

The story goes on to say that Marcellus was in consternation, apprehending terrible consequences from this seeming insult to the image of the emperor, but Peter bids him sprinkle the fragments with water in Christ's name, and when he obeys, the statue is made whole again.

Besides the incident of the broken statue in both the last-mentioned miracles, the occasion of the exorcism is the same — an unmannerly laugh under circumstances that called for respectful silence. There can be no doubt that the narrative of Philostratus and that in the Acts of Peter are closely related, and they are probably derived from a common original, which may have been either of pagan or of Christian origin. The additional episode of the miraculous restoration of the statue suggests that the Acts of Peter is one degree further removed from the source than the story in the Life of Apollonius. Reitzenstein [23] held that the story was originally told of an Egyptian Magus, finding proof of such an origin in the incident where the fragments of the broken statue are sprinkled and re-united; for, as he remarks, the daily cult in Egyptian temples began with a ritual lustration of the cult-statue, which was intended to bring the god back to life after his sleep or death during the night. Such an assumption is unnecessary. Miracles involving the restoration of broken objects were known in classical antiquity;

[23] Hellenistische Wundererzählungen, 54.

Asclepius' restoration of a broken cup is the theme of one of the miracle-records of Epidaurus,[24] and when such a miracle was attributed to a Christian saint, it was only natural that the effective act should be accompanied by aspersion with holy water.

When the Gerasene "Legion" is driven from the afflicted man, the demons enter a herd of swine and destroy them. This is the act of physical violence that bears witness to the reality of the expulsion; and in the source from which Mark drew it is probable that there was no more thought of the ethical or social problems that might arise from the incident than there was in the stories of exorcism as practised by Eleazar and Apollonius. Mark records without comment that the swineherds fled and brought news of the happening to the town, and that the inhabitants, when the whole story was told, besought Jesus to leave their country.

In certain other miracles, the violence of the demon on departing takes the form of an injury to the body from which he is expelled; so in Mark 1. 26, *σπαράξαν αὐτὸν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἀκάθαρτον καὶ φωνήσαν φωνῇ μεγάλῃ ἐξῆλθεν ἐξ αὐτοῦ*. Such convulsions may of course be attributed to the mental malady which men of that time interpreted as demonic possession; this explanation would be particularly appropriate in such a case as that of the epileptic boy (Mark 9. 14–29). As soon as the boy is brought into the presence of Jesus, *τὸ πνεῦμα εὐθὺς συνεσπάραξεν αὐτόν, καὶ πεσὼν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐκυλίετο ἀφρίζων* (20); and after the command to depart, *κράξας καὶ πολλὰ σπαράξας ἐξῆλθεν*. However, there can be little doubt that in the thought of the time the final convulsion was interpreted as the last spiteful act of the demon, whose violence was a sign that he was gone to return no more.

[24] Dittenberger, Sylloge[3], 1168, ll. 79–90.

THE NAME "ISCARIOT"

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One of the puzzles of the Gospel tradition has been the interpretation of the epithet which distinguishes the betrayer of Jesus from other bearers of the very common name Judas. The attempt to explain it has brought forth perhaps as many impossible theories as any other New Testament riddle of the kind. The most recent authoritative work dealing with Palestinian affairs, the Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. 6 (1942), merely mentions three attempted explanations of the name: 1. "man of Kerioth"; 2. derivation from Hebrew *sheker* ("falsehood"); 3. from Latin *scortea*, meaning the "leather bag" which Judas as treasurer carried (John 12: 6, 13: 29). The reader is left to make his own choice, as no preference is expressed.

The word *iscariot* (or *scariot*) belongs only to the Greek tradition. It is obviously the result of transliteration of some Semitic word or words; the problem is, to find the precise origin. There is some variation, not immediately easy of explanation, in the forms which have been handed down. They are the following:

Ἰούδας ὁ Ἰσκαριώτης, Matthew 10: 4, John 12: 4, 14: 22. (In Mark 14: 43 ὁ Ἰσκ. appears to be secondary.)

Ἰούδας Ἰσκαριώθ, Mark 3: 19, 14: 10, Luke 6: 16 (the text merely taken over from the parallel in Mark).

Ὁ λεγόμενος Ἰ. Ἰσκαριώτης, Matthew 26: 14.

Ἰ. ὁ καλούμενος Ἰσκαριώτης, Luke 22: 3.

Ἰ. Σίμωνος Ἰσκαριώτης, John 13: 2.

Ἰ. Σ. Ἰσκαριώτου, John 6: 71, 13: 26.

The query may naturally be raised, why the reading of Mark is not put first in the list, as that of the oldest gospel and therefore especially worthy of attention. It is true that Mark was composed and published a few years before the other synoptic Gospels, but its material is in no respect older than that of Matthew and Luke. All three drew from the same reservoir,

as has been shown repeatedly and in abundant detail. In the present case, as will appear, Mark's reading proves to be secondary and wrong.

The explanation of "Iscariot" now most commonly adopted, the only one thus far proposed which has seemed to have any real plausibility, interprets it as "the man of Kerioth"; taking the first syllable, *is*, to be the transliteration of Hebrew אִישׁ, "man," and the rest to be the name of a city. On this supposition, the true transcription of the name would be *'īš Ḳariōth* (or *Qariōth*, the more convenient transcription). Several obvious difficulties of this interpretation are suggested at once, and the first of them concerns the supposed city itself.

The city-name Q^{e}riyyōth, which is thought to be present in "Iscariot," is found in Joshua 15:25, Amos 2:2 (?), and Jeremiah 48:24, 41, always in the same form.[1] In Joshua 15:25, in a list of cities in the extreme south of Judah, we find the name (or names) קְרִיּוֹת חֶצְרוֹן, Q^{e}riyyōth Ḥeṣrōn. The Massoretic pointing separates the words, making *two* city-names, and this prescription is followed, as usual, by Jerome and the Targum. The LXX, on the contrary, has αἱ πόλεις Ἀσερών, "the towns of Hesron," and this reading, with which the Syriac version agrees, is adopted by most of the modern authorities. The text is uncertain, however, as all admit, the name Hesron is doubtful, and the conjecture that the Arabic name Qaryatēn, found in southern Judah (as well as in numerous other places) represents these same "towns" is precarious, to say the least. We have in fact no satisfactory evidence of any Palestinian town named Καριώθ. If it should be proposed to connect Judas with the *Moabite* city Q^{e}riyyōth, there are still great difficulties to be met.

If the first element in the name attached to Judas was the Hebrew *'īš*, why was it not translated? Dalman, Worte Jesu, p. 41, calls this "höchst befremdlich," and so it is; was איש an unfamiliar word? Dalman's own conclusion, that the evangelists did not know the meaning of the epithet Iscariot, seems hardly plausible. There certainly is no ground for

[1] The definite article in Jer. 48:41 is probably mere dittography. In Amos 2:2 it is not perfectly certain that a proper name is intended.

questioning the representation of all the Gospels, that Jesus was betrayed by one of his own little company, and the fact must have become generally known very soon. Few will doubt that some epithet distinguishing the betrayer from the other disciple named Judas was henceforth attached to the name, that it was well understood at the time, and that its meaning could not be forgotten while there was still a Palestinian tradition. If the epithet was merely a designation of the place from which this Judas came, the employment of a mystifying transliteration instead of the simple ὁ ἀπό (as e.g. in John 12:21 and 21:2) would be very strange indeed! The name was a household word with all the Christians, from the first, and the four evangelists were not so far outside the line of Palestinian tradition that it came to them all as a riddle. If the *is* meant "man," why did no one of them translate it?

The *quantity* of this initial syllable is also a significant matter. If it transliterates the Hebrew noun, the vowel is of course long and unchangeable. It is therefore important to notice that some ancient versions made from the Greek pay no attention to this vowel, but begin the word with the syllable *skar*. The Syriac versions (Old Syr., Peshitta, Palest. Syr.) have uniformly *Skaryōṭā*. The D-Greek has generally σκαριωτης in the Synoptic Gospels (σκαριωθ in Mark 3:19, Luke 6:16, and John 6:71). Nowhere indeed at any time is there indication of a long vowel at the beginning of the word, the evidence points rather to a prosthetic syllable.

Would it not be natural to interpret Ισ- as transliteration of אִישׁ? Doubtless; and it is thus interpreted, before our eyes, in several passages in the D-text of John's Gospel; see below. Many of those who have discussed the name "Iscariot" include a reference to the Ἰστωβος of Josephus, Antt., 7, vi, 1, a name taken over from the LXX of 2 Samuel 10:6, 8, where Cod. B's Ειστωβ indicates the long vowel. But this name has no real bearing on the present case.

How could *Hebrew* have been thus employed in a popular epithet? some students of the language-history of Palestine have asked; was there no Aramaic word for "man"? Wellhausen, Evang. Marci (1903), p. 25, remarks: "An das he-

bräische *isch* zu denken und 'Mann von Kerioth' zu übersetzen, ist ausgeschlossen." Others have been equally emphatic. Schlatter, Der Evangelist Matthäus (1929), p. 327, on Matthew 10:4, outlines the "man-of-Kariot" theory, and then adds: "Gegen diese Deutung spricht aber, das איש nur hebräisch ist, und nicht in die volkstümliche Sprache gehört." The concluding words of this verdict express a fact, too often ignored, which certainly seems decisive, for Judas was given his by-name by the common people, and in their own language.

Dalman, Worte Jesu, pp. 41 f., and again in Jesus-Jeschua, p. 26, attempts to show from Talmud and Midrash that "man of" this or that place, employing the Hebrew word איש, was quite customary (wohlbekannter Sprachgebrauch) in Palestine in Talmudic times. He has no difficulty in collecting examples, and it is needless to say that they are all taken from Hebrew contexts. Schlatter (see above) contributes others, but recognizes their true character. They belong, without exception, to the "scholastic language" which Moore characterizes in his Judaism, I, 99 f., the לשון חכמים; an admirable vehicle for its purposes, sharply distinguished on the one side from Biblical Hebrew, and utterly remote on the other side from the language of the people. Dalman's examples and his inference from them have been very widely quoted and influential, but how this material can bear on our question is not apparent. Judas was not given his nickname by the Tannaite schoolmen, and it is *only* from their learned lanaguage that the illustrations are taken.

The reading of the "Western Text" in several passages of the Gospel of John has aroused much interest, seeming as it does to give support to the theory that "Iscariot" contains the name of a city or village. In John 12:4, 13:2, 26, and 14:22, where the standard text reads Ἰσκαριώτης, the D-Greek has απο καρυωτου; there is some evidence that this was originally the case in 6:71 also. This means, beyond doubt, that Ἰσ- was interpreted as the transliteration of Hebrew איש. While the origin of the D-text was still unknown, it was possible to attach some importance to this form of the supposed place-name, though the majority of scholars, including Dalman (Worte,

p. 41, note 4), regarded it as merely derived from Ἰσκαριώτης. Now that the true character of the "Western" Greek has been fully demonstrated (Documents of the Primitive Church, Chapter IV), its reading in the passages named is seen to have none of its supposed importance. In making the new Aramaic version of the Gospels and Acts, the translator (hardly the one who translated the other Gospels) reproduced Ισκαριωτ(ης) as איש קריוט. When this in turn was made over into the Western Greek, the translator naturally had in mind the adjective καρυωτός, the noun καρυῶτις, etc., and (as many have conjectured) thought of a "town of walnut-palms." In fact, however, "Iscariot" has nothing to do with any place-name.

Another question calling for discussion concerns the final syllable of the name. What may we suppose the original Greek form to have been, and how is the conflicting testimony of our sources to be explained?

One of the two traditional ways of writing the name has a distinctly Palestinian sound. This is the *Iscariōth* which is attested by Mark 3: 19 and 14: 10, and is copied from the former of the two passages in Luke 6:16. It has the very common ending of Hebrew proper names, which is regularly transcribed in Greek as -ωθ and in Latin as *-oth*. There could be no imaginable reason for altering it. Over against these three occurrences are nine occurrences of the ending -ωτης, attested in Matthew, Luke, and John; while in the oldest versions, the Syriac and the Latin, the name *in the two passages in Mark*, and in Luke 6: 16 as well, is found to end in *-ot*, not *-ōth*! In these three passages, as everywhere else, the Latin has *Iscariotes*. The translator of the Old Syriac (a version made by Palestinians in the first quarter of the second century; see Documents of the Primitive Church, Chapter VI) likewise did not have before him in his Greek at any point the ending -ωθ, but only -ωτης. Recognizing the -ης as a Greek ending he replaced it with the Syriac ending -ā, writing *Skaryōṭā*.

From the foregoing facts alone a verdict could hardly be pronounced, for such questions are not to be settled by counting witnesses. There is other evidence, however, which suffices to turn the scale. While it is not easy to see why or how the

good Hebrew ending *-ōth* could have been altered to the barbarous *-ōṭ*, the change in the other direction would be very natural indeed. An editor, or even a scribe, might easily make the supposed improvement, and the mischief would not be repaired but would remain. More important still is the fact that the ending *-ωτης* affords a perfect explanation of the epithet applied to the betrayer, while with the ending *-ωθ* the name has no plausible explanation at all. The true Greek reading is certainly *Ἰσκαριώτης*, and it probably was uniformly present in all four Gospels alike, in their original form.

A new complication seems to be introduced by certain readings in the Gospel of John. In 6:71 the Greek has *τὸν Ἰούδαν Σίμωνος Ἰσκαριώτου*, "Judas son of *Simon Iscariot*," and in 13:26, where the phrase recurs, the reading is *Ἰούδᾳ Σίμωνος Ἰσκαριώτου*, again treating Iscariot as a family name. In 13:2, however, still another occurrence *of the same phrase* naming Judas' father, the reading is *Ἰούδας Σίμωνος Ἰσκαριώτης*, "Judas Iscariot son of Simon"!

As soon as it is recognized that the Greek of John renders an Aramaic original, the matter is clear. In The Four Gospels, p. 322, there is a note on 6:71: "a perfectly certain mistake in translation," and the error is one which is naturally and very frequently made in Greek translations from Semitic. In the passages before us (and the Aramaic reading would be exactly the same in all three cases), *Judah bar Simon Iscar.* is the regular way of writing "Judas Iscariot son of Simon." It is easy to see how a Greek interpreter might hesitate, or simply take the easiest course, as this translator did in 6:71. It would seem that when he came to chapter 13 he realized the ambiguity and gave *both* interpretations. But the epithet applied only to Judas, there was no Simon Iscariot.

The curious theory of derivation of the name from the Latin *scortea* deserves a word of mention, if only because it was suggested (as one possibility among others) by the great English scholar John Lightfoot. It was for this reason, evidently, that it was given especial attention in the 14th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica; article 'Judas Iscariot,' by Canon A. L. Williams.

Lightfoot comes to the matter, and deals with it briefly, in his 'Hebrew and Talmudical Exercitations upon the Gospel of St. Matthew,' in the comment on Matthew 10:4. See The Whole Works of John Lightfoot, ed. J. R. Pitman (1823), Vol. xi, p. 172. Lightfoot was attracted by a word in the Talmud which sounded somewhat like the name Iscariot. This is אסקורטיא, *iskortia*, also written *skortia*, without the prosthetic letter. In Greek transcription this would be Ἰσκορτια. It is defined in Bab. Nedarim, 55b, as a coat or apron of leather (that is, Lat. *scortea*). "In such aprons," Lightfoot adds, "they had purses sown, in which they were wont to carry their money. . . . And hence it may be, Judas had that title of 'the purse-bearer,' as he was called 'Judas with the apron.'" Here the reference is to John 12:6 and 13:29. Dr. Williams interposes, with good reason, that the money was carried in a "box" (γλωσσόκομον), but he adds: "a portable box would certainly have been covered with leather to preserve it from the eastern sun." Granting this, could such a casket possibly have been called *scortea*? Evidently, this theory of the origin of Judas' by-name is too far-fetched to be taken seriously.

Another, rather desperate, attempt to explain the term derives it from the Greek σικάριος, "bandit, assassin."[2] This had been suggested, hesitatingly, by Wellhausen in his note on Mark 3:19 (1903), but he made no attempt to carry it further. Others, however, caught at the idea, and it was fully elaborated by Friedrich Schulthess, Das Problem der Sprache Jesus (1917), pp. 41, 55, as will appear. Now Judas does not seem to have been a cutthroat, nor a man who would have joined a company of bandits. According to the narrative of John 18:6, he was rather a timid soul than a hardened malefactor; for when at Gethsemane Jesus said to the soldiers, "I am he," and the deed of treachery was accomplished, Judas stumbled backward and fell to the ground (certainly the original text, reading ἀπῆλθεν and ἔπεσεν;[3] see The Four Gospels, pp. 327 f.). This

[2] The *sicarii* described in Josephus, Antt., 20, viii, 10 (cf. Acts 21:38) came after Judas' time, and there could have been no reason for associating him with them. On the Sicarii and the Zealots, see The Beginnings of Christianity, Part I, pp. 421 ff.

[3] Compare the similar case in Matt. 28:7, where from the paraliels in Mark and Luke it is evident that the present reading originated in a scribal error, some early

narrator, at least, who was free to form his own picture of Judas, did not think of him as a ruffian.

Schulthess conjectured that the Aramaic-speaking Christians retained Judas' epithet *ὁ σικάριος*, which had become fixed in usage, transferring it to their own language and thus producing a form *isqaryāā* (observe, however, that when the Jews actually began to speak of the Sicarii, they called them סִיקָרִין; see the Talmudic lexicons). The origin of *this* strange word being no longer understood, the Greek interpreter, apparently recognizing a descriptive adjective, reproduced it in the form *ἰσκαριώτης*.

Aside from the improbability, at every point, of these assumptions, the hypothesis is ruled out by the fact that the first vowel of Latin *sīcarius* and Greek *σῑκάριος* is long, and could not possibly have been dropped out. This theory, then, deserves no attention.[4]

There are several other theories which need not be given space here. *No* interpretation of the name which has thus far been proposed can survive critical examination.

Since there is no evidence that Judas was called Iscariot during his lifetime, or that the name was ever borne by anyone else, the probability is strong that the epithet was a reproach, an opprobrious appellation given to the man because of his deed. If this is true, the authors of the nickname (whatever it signified) were the Nazarenes, the disciples of Jesus, and it must have been coined by them at once, as soon as the story began to be told. Attached under such unique circumstances, and with the execration of a community sounding in it, the name would hold its place. This theory, at all events, calls first for examination. In modern times it often has been held that Judas was a sincere and loyal disciple of Jesus, but this is not the view of the evangelists, nor of any of their sources.

One of the three theories deemed worthy of attention by the Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, quoted near the beginning of

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copyist having made the extremely common mistake of writing *εἶπον* instead of *εἶπεν*.

[4] Nöldeke, in the Nachträge to Schulthess' grammar, p. 151, rejects the theory, but has nothing better to propose than the old conjecture: "es bleibt bei איש קריות."

this article, would connect the name Iscariot in some way with the Hebrew word *šeqer*, "falsehood." The reason for this suggestion is obvious, for the consonants of the σκαρ which forms the root of the epithet are those which form the root שׁקר, and the fitness of the word "false" to characterize the traitor needs no argument. Hebrew, indeed, is out of the question, for no other language than that of the common people can be considered; but the suggestion is on the right track.

Aramaic has the same root, and employs it in just the manner and with the same meaning as the Hebrew. Moreover, it can account exactly for the more common form of the name, Ἰσκαριώτης, as Hebrew could not, and as no other attempted explanation has even seemed to do.

The usual term in Aramaic for "deceit, treachery, falsehood," is שִׁקַּר, שִׁקְרָא (*šeqar*, *šiqrā*). The appellative, "liar, traitor, hypocrite," is most commonly made from the root in either of two ways: by the form *šaqqār*, which expresses habitual action or some other intensification of the root idea; or by appending to the abstract noun the adjective ending *-ai*, producing the form שִׁקְרַי, *šaqrai*, denoting the man characterized by *šeqar*. The latter of the two is the form which lies at the basis of the name Iscariot. Observe that the *a*-vowel in this affformative syllable is not long (*-āi*), as in Syriac and perhaps in the older Aramaic generally, but is short.[5] See Dalman's Grammatik, pp. 176–178, and the many vocalized examples which he gives.

A sentence illustrating the use of the word is quoted in the lexicons (Aruk, Levy, Jastrow) from Yebamoth 55b: "Either he is a liar (שַׁקְרַאי) or I am a liar (שַׁקְרַי)."[6] When the word is made definite, "*The* false one," by adding the ending *-ā*

[5] The shortened pronunciation of an etymologically long *ā* seems particularly characteristic of the Palestinian speech; see my Notes on the Aramaic of Daniel, pp. 262 f., Ezra Studies, p. 194.

[6] The orthography of the word appears to be purposely varied here, a device which has other illustration in Jewish literature. The lexicographers, however, hesitate over the second form. The Aruk has *šaqqārai*, Levy *šaqqerai*, Jastrow *šaqrī*. No one of the three proposed readings, I think, can be successfully defended. Both ways of writing the ending are regular in Talmud and Targum. It is worth noticing that the superfluous א in the diphthong *ăi* appears frequently in Palest. Syr. also; see Schulthess, Gramm. des christlich-palästinischen Aramäisch, p. 8.

(equivalent to the definite article), the form is שְׁקָרְיָא, *šᵉqaryā* (or אִשְׁקָרְיָא, *išqaryā*); not, as might be expected, *šaqrᵉyā*. This illustrates a well known feature of the Palestinian pronunciation, the shifting of a syllable or the production of a new syllable, as the result of original pronunciation with a glide-vowel. Thus *maṭlᵉlā* > *mᵉṭalᵉlā*, *madnᵉḥā* > *mᵉdenḥā* and *maddinḥā*, *maʿrᵉbā* > *maʿarᵉba*, *tiklᵉtha* > *tᵉkēltā*, and many others.[7]

It is interesting to find in the manuscripts of the Palest. Syr. Lectionary a number of examples of this word *šᵉqaryā*, employed in passages of strong emotion as the rendering of the Greek word *ὑποκριτής*. It is found only in the Gospels, fourteen times in all; twelve of the occurrences being in Matthew, one in Mark (12: 15, borrowed from Matthew), and one in Luke (13: 15). In all but one of these cases the plural number is used, and for this reason it happens that the true history of the epithet has not always been understood. The form of the first word in Matthew 7: 5, *šqaryā*, "Hypocrite!" has been suspected of being the result of a scribal error — though it occurs, without variation, in all the texts. It is not found elsewhere (that is, *in the singular number*) in the Lectionary, and it is foreign to Edessene Syriac. Schulthess, in his Lexicon Syropalaestinum, p. 214, lists it, correctly enough, as the emphatic form of שקרי and the equivalent of the Massoretic Aram. שַׁקְרָאָה, but adds: *si vere est traditum, quod maxime dubito.* Payne Smith, col. 4297, books the word without a query. The plural form, which occurs uniformly elsewhere, might equally well be referred to the intensive *šaqqār* (mentioned above), and thus Schulthess records it; but in this he is certainly mistaken. Though little weight is to be given to the diacritical dots which occasionally appear, yet in a dozen occurrences of the word it would be reasonable to expect some indication of the double consonant furnished with a long vowel. In fact, the few dots that are used speak plainly against the supposed form. The true vocalization of the plural is presumably *šaqrayyā*.

It appears, then, that the Jewish Aramaic epithet *šaqrai*, *šᵉqaryā*, "false one, liar, hypocrite," known from Talmud and

[7] Dalman, Gramm., pp. 93–95; Schulthess, Gramm., p. 28; Brockelmann, Vergleich. Gramm., I, pp. 216–218.

Targum, continued in use for some time in the Christian Palestinian dialect; and the occurrence in Matthew 7:5 of the very word which became "Iscariot" is a fact of no little interest.

The emergence of the sobriquet in Christian use, and the history of its subsequent variation, are not difficult to understand and to set forth. As soon as the story of the betrayal made its way through Palestine, the man or boy in the street began to speak with execration of *Yehuda šqaryā*, "Judah the false!" The cry was taken up, and repeated, wherever there were "Nazarenes"; the epithet stuck where it had fallen.

The written form regularly, and indeed also the spoken form frequently, would (as in all such cases) acquire the prosthetic ʾ and a more distinct initial syllable, thus becoming *išqaryā*. Whenever the opprobrious nickname only was used, as would naturally happen among the Aramaic-speaking Christians, *Išqaryā*, "*the* False One," is the form which would oftenest have been employed.

The Greek authors and translators, Nazarenes, who came to this epithet knew perfectly what it meant, and how firmly fixed in use it had become. So instead of attempting to translate it they kept it, in a regularly formed Greek transcription, giving it an ending which not only suited the meaning but also pointed to the exact form of the Aramaic word. A denominative or gentilic substantive formed on a stem ending in *-ιᾱ* (with long *ᾱ*) is regularly given the ending *-ωτης*. Thus from Σικελίᾱ, Sicily, is formed Σικελιώτης; from Φθίᾱ, the famed city in Thessaly, Φθιώτης; from στρατιᾱ́, army, στρατιώτης, etc. Accordingly, the transliterated Aramaic ισκαριᾱ produced ἰσκαριώτης.

When this hybrid name, Judas Iscariotes, came into circulation and was much used among Greek-speaking Christians, with no thought of Aramaic etymology, the *-ης*, *-ēs*, was naturally taken to be the inflectional ending, and the name itself was treated as Iskariōt.[8] In our standard Greek text of Mark,

[8] This is well illustrated in the "Western" text of John's Gospel, in the passages, already mentioned, where Judas the betrayer is named. The Aramaic translator, reproducing his Greek with meticulous faithfulness, wrote *ʾīš qariōṭ*, whence eventually came the new Greek reading, ὁ ἀπὸ Καρυωτοῦ, as explained above. Equally good illustration to the same effect is furnished by the Syriac versions, which all without exception treat the name in each and all of its occurrences as ending with the emphatic *t*.

on the contrary, the ending is -ωθ; apparently (as was conjectured above) an editorial change introduced with the aim of "restoring" the more pleasing and truly Semitic ending of proper names in place of the barbarous -ōṭ, which seemed neither Semitic nor Greek. The existing evidence appears to show that the *original* reading of the Greek Mark was like that in the other Gospels; for the two most ancient versions, the Syriac and the Latin, show in Mark no sign of the reading with -*ōth*, which would hardly have been ignored by them if they had found it. For all translations from the Greek, indeed, the well-established form Ἰσκαριώτης was normative.

THEISM AND HYPERTHEISM

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Theists, I suppose, are persons who believe in "God's" existence. Atheists are persons who deny the same.

Such statements may be suitable, and even adequate, for many proper purposes. In several contexts it is silly or malicious to interrogate them closely. Even in theology, which is, or should be, some kind of science, they may have, and they do have, their use and their propriety. For many theological purposes, however (and also for some others) they are far too vague. It may be wrong, no doubt, to tell a theologian that he must either produce an accurate definition of what he means by "God" or be forever shamed. His contention may be that deity is incomprehensible in detail and very nearly or altogether incomprehensible in principle. He may also say that definitions are *démodé* in good new-fashioned science. On the other hand he should not be able to afford to be recklessly vague. He ought to give an intelligible account of what he would be at when he calls himself a theist, or, at any rate, a clear account of what "God" is *not*.

As it seems to me, contemporary theologians are apt to be rather insensitive to this requirement. One of the commonest events in their world is to find that once an argument about theism has got under way (for there is usually greater tranquillity in the beginnings of it) they loudly protest "O, but you're not talking about theism at all." Their meaning seems to be that you are contemplating something rather different from Christian monotheism. If you begin to ask whether Aristotle, or Sankara or certain of the Sufis were not theists after all, they begin to murmur *Non per dialecticam*, forgetting that if it did not please the deity to give his people salvation by dialectics it did please him to give them theology in precisely that way.

In short, a pretty careful scrutiny of critical terms is frequently essential.

Let us take smallish things first. Monotheism is an accurate

and convenient term for expressing the belief that there is but one God. Why then deny that polytheism is also a form of theism?

It is irrelevant to say that polytheism is too crude a form of theism to be taken seriously; but if the statement were relevant, what would follow? Monotheism may also be crude, and certain forms of crude polytheism seem to have been more sophisticated than a vague acceptance of a numinous *mana* which, nevertheless, was one rather than many (or may have been). Apart from that, why assume that polytheism is crude or careless or both? The Olympic Gods, or the gods of the nether world, or of various shifting henotheisms may have been relatively crude, and a high degree of unity and integration may be an essential mark of any developed form of theism. A society, however, may be very highly integrated. To hold with some Indian philosophers that if there were many Gods they must disagree is not a view that looks at all like an inescapable metaphysical verity. What is crude about the suggestion that deity may be the name for a society of powerful and gentle spirits in communion and unison with one another? The Gods might be in full accord and not be a huddle of divisive entities like a celestial League of Nations. Again, if God *were* a single being, what metaphysical or other guarantee would we have that he was in unison with himself either at one time or at all times? It is a great pity, I think, if metaphysical pluralists who deny the supremacy of any single ultimate entity but ascribe what would commonly be called divine properties to the society of ultimate reals in which they believe should be called and should call themselves atheists [1] on the ground that the current Western associations of the word "theism" are almost always monotheistic in some rather special sense. Here it is better to be a verbalist and point out that polytheism is nonsense unless it is a form of theism.

A more interesting point concerns pantheism.

I am not now discussing the merits of pantheism, although if it is held (as many Christian theists do hold) that God is *all*, that there is nothing outside him, it is hard to see how "pantheism" can be discarded in all its forms. Again, I am not much

[1] As McTaggart did.

interested in the relations between pantheism and mono- or polytheism. Distributive pantheism (i.e. the doctrine that whatever is, is either a God or a godling) would seem to be the most extreme form of polytheism that there was (at any rate until we began to ask what the ultimate constituents of reality *were*). Totalitarian pantheism (which is not logically inconsistent with the distributive variety) is usually regarded as a species of philosophical monism.

But let us by-pass all that. When it is said (and this is a common saying) that pantheism, content to remain such, is *not* theism, the meaning must be that "theism" is narrower than pantheism, and requires a further differentiating characteristic.

This seems to me to be a very inconvenient way of arguing. What is the point of taking pantheism seriously unless it is what most of its friends believe it to be, a perfectly genuine form of theism? Convenience, however, may be a relatively small matter. What is important is that essential differences should be clearly expressed and not allowed to take cover in the mists.

In the main what pantheism is said to lack is the due recognition that deity is supramundane. Theism proper, we are told, makes no such mistake.

This seems hard on the pantheists. Strictly, if God be *all*, this "all" must include whatever is supramundane. In short the criticism amounts to saying that pantheism should be understood to be the doctrine that God is immanent *in the world* (the *mundus*, of course, and not simply the *orbis terrarum*) and does not transcend the "world" in any relevant sense. In effect, therefore, we are asked to say that theism is always in some sense supernatural and that there is no pantheism except nature-pantheism.

As I have said, pantheists may reasonably complain of this attempt to impoverish their resources by definition. Not all of them need be Nature-worshippers in most of the current senses of "Nature." At the very least a clear indication should be given of the respects in which the divine immanence asserted in pantheism falls short of the transcendence that "genuine" theism is said to require.

Let us consider some of the principal senses in which divine transcendence (i.e. transcendence of "the world" or of "nature") may be asserted.

(1) The plainest doctrine (usually said to be rather crude) is simply that God is a being distinct from all the beings in the world and from the world itself. He need not be "above the bright blue sky," we are told, but may be spaceless (or wrap himself in a space of his own); and being eternal or timeless he is beyond all that is temporal.

This view is even more mysterious regarding time than regarding space, but it seems to be straightforward and it is consistent with many sub-varieties e.g. with the view that the world is just an isolated episode God-produced and later God-annihilated, or with the Eastern view that there is a succession of world-cycles divinely set agoing and anon divinely stopped "in order that sometimes there may be peace."

(2) A very different view would be that "Nature" is a name for all that there is (all that is finite and infinitude too) but that it connotes a certain set of properties only, and so that it is guilty of very flagrant sins of omission if it is taken to be a *full* indication of the properties of existence. According to this view the thing is as if one were content to describe a nation by elementary census statistics, or a man by reference to his weight alone paying no attention to his complexion, tastes or morals. In this case there would be no supramundane existent or existents but there might well be extensive supernatural properties in all that falls within the purview of natural knowledge; and it would be possible that the supernatural properties of the natural-propertied might be integrated in such a way as to make the language of the most majestic monotheism defensible and even intelligible.

(3) If it were held that to neglect anything is necessarily to muddle everything a consequence of the above view (i.e. of (2) *supra*) would be that "Nature" must falsify by omission, and so is the name for a radical misconception of reality, well-grounded in certain senses but eventually false. So far as I can see, however, this alleged consequence is itself ill-drawn and confounds between a risk and a certainty. Abstraction, though

hazardous, need not falsify. So we must distinguish between the natural omissions of the above (i.e. of (2) *supra*) and the view now to be considered viz. that nature is the name for a systematic misconception of the real (perhaps well-grounded, and so not *merely* illusory). This misconception, it may be said, is occasioned, perhaps excused, and perhaps (in certain ways) rendered inevitable by the piecemeal and helter-skelter character of our sensations combined with the fact that our evidence for existence is derived from sensations and that we have to construe these as best we may (which is not very well) by a species of rule of guess.

In this case the distinction between the mundane and the supramundane would be epistemological and not ontological. There would be no contrast between a "world" and an "overworld." There would not even be a contrast between the "overworldly" and the "this-worldly" properties of anything that had this-worldly properties in a sense not ultimately erroneous. The contrast would be between systematic misconception, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, an order of conceptions that was true.

(4) Another view that prevails in some philosophies and in many theologies is that "Nature" (as a whole if it is one) and all natural things have some sort of imperfection in their "mode of being." This imperfection is described in many various ways. "Nature," it is said, is a mixture of being and non-being. It exists but isn't "real." It has being but only "creaturely" or "created" or "dependent" being. It contains a moment of "negativity" which is "unreality" and "non-being." It exists but is not self-existent. It exists but is not self-explanatory. And so on as fancy dictates.

Despite august authority I submit that these views are entirely without substance being based upon an elementary mistake. They confuse epistemology with ontology and assume that if you partly apprehend and partly misapprehend X you have to believe that there are at least *two* X's viz. X-in-part-apprehended and X-in-part-misapprehended. They also hold that you can go on to say that one at least of these has some sort of "partial being." And that is fantasy.

In general it may be true that when we say "This exists" we are usually understood to mean "This is a physical body." In the fundamental sense, however, to say "This exists" (whether "this" be finite or infinite) is just to say "There is this" whatever "this" may be. That is a simple and a final statement (whether or not it is hard to establish). It is quite wrong to say that anything "exists more" than anything else. There may be more of it. It may be stronger and tougher and so forth. But if it exists it just exists, weak or strong, enduring or transient. "Creaturely things" if they exist at all, do really exist and cannot half-exist. The same would be true of the other statements made above about "negativity" "non-self-explanatoriness" and the like although in detail each particular way of describing this alleged distinction would require a special slant in the appropriate answer to it.

As regards pantheism, which was the occasion for this excursus, it seems clear that while all or most pantheists would and should reject the first of these types of supramundane theism, most of them need not reject either the second or the third. Spinoza, for instance (who is commonly reputed a prince among pantheists) may be cited as an adherent of the second (if one supposes that his "third grade of knowledge" was not intended to upset his "second grade") or of the third (if one takes "natural knowledge" to be incurably temporal). As to the fourth view, I think it should be rejected by everyone out of hand. If, however, the question be not what should be held but what has been held, it is clear that the fourth view is united in many philosophies with some sort of philosophical monism, and that there are very strong grounds for supposing that philosophical monism, if it has any theistic color at all, is liker (totalitarian) pantheism than any other shade of theism.

Up to the present I have been discussing the way in which various theories which have a verbal (and, I should say, very often much more than a merely verbal) claim to be accounted forms of theism are assumed *not* to be forms of theism in many quarters on many occasions. The assumption seems to be that nothing is theism which does not closely resemble Christian theism.

Hence I think there is occasion for misgivings. There are few who would say outright that theism *means* Christian theism, that and that alone. Instead they prefer to use the word (and freely censure others for not using it) in a sense which is not too sharply in contrast with the penumbra of association that usually clings to the theism of Christian dogma. This course (while adopted, no doubt in all candor) has grave disadvantages. It is loose where it should be stringent and avoids cardinal issues, in particular the question whether it is quite clear that "Christian theism" is just one thing with a firm central thesis as well as the equally important question whether certain of the discredited theories (e.g. certain forms of pantheism) may not resemble much "Christian theism" in most of their essentials a good deal more closely than many forms of "theism" that do not come under the ban.

If it is the associative penumbra of "Christian theism" that governs the proper use of the term "theism" in theological arguments, we should have to say much more than that theism must be in some sense monotheistic and also supramundane. For mere deism would be these. God, we should have to say, must be wise and also righteous although his wisdom may be very unlike the wisdom of men (which may be only sagacious foolishness) and although his righteousness may not be at all similar to the righteousness of scribes and Pharisees, Greek philosophers and canonical jurists. Tenderness, compassion, and a discriminating lovingkindness for mankind would also be included, and that would be part of the insistence (more vociferous to-day and, I think, rather less careful than it used to be) upon the essential connection between "theism" and the belief in a "personal" God. Some indeed would seem to go so far as to say that the very notion of an impersonal (which need not be a sub-personal) deity is self-contradictory. It is admitted that the personality *in* God as well as the personality *of* God is a very knotty point in Christian divinity, but, at the very least (we are informed) God must be personal in the sense that the sort of spiritual integration which empirically is seen at its best in a wise and saintly man is *mutatis mutandis* (and great are the *mutanda*) a fundamental character in the divine being.

This preamble, nominally at least, has been about the term "theism," its meaning, its use and its associative penumbrae in Western theology. Nothing has, so far, been said explicitly about hypertheism and its relation to theism.

By hypertheism I mean the doctrine that the evidence which leads to God also leads beyond him. That is often said. According to Eckhart, Godhead was above God and beyond him. According to many neo-Platonists The One is above and beyond each and every divine henad. According to Sankara and other Indian philosophers Ishvara is only a God and so is below the ultimate Brahman, the non-dual ultimate of the Vedanta. According to many philosophical monists God is below the Absolute.

Clearly, there is little point in discussing the relations between theism and hypertheism unless theism is interpreted with some precision. If any philosophy with a Godward tendency, no matter where, is to be accounted theism, hypertheism is not opposed to *such* a theism or contrasted with it. If any philosophy which finds a place for God is "theism" there is no proper contrast between theism and hypertheism. In this vague way it is quite common to find mystical and super-intellectual hypertheisms accounted forms of theism even when the exponents of such theories protest (as Sankara and Bradley did).

As I have said, arguments which are quite sufficiently precise for the purposes of certain contexts are not nearly precise enough for others. As it seems to me the contrast between theism and hypertheism cannot afford to be vague. If you must go beyond God you have no business to speak as if you were content to stop short with God, even if it be less misleading to say you are a theist than to say you are an atheist. It is difficult to take theism seriously unless it professes to give an *ultimate* explanation of the nature of things. When we say "God knoweth" we mean to say something final. What is said to be "in God's hands" is presumed *not* to be in any higher hands. And so forth. If theism makes any lesser claims it is only a sham.

Consider, for instance, Samuel Alexander's "theism." God, according to this philosophy, is the *next* stage above mind in the

up-and-up *nisus* with which space-time is perpetually in labor. There is not the slightest reason for supposing that God is the last stage in this emergent process. Indeed there is every reason (if there is *any* reason) for supposing the contrary. Smith's dog worships Smith, and Smith worships his God, and Smith's God worships a being that is higher still. In short what is properly worshipful is just the up-and-up tendency itself. There is no point in worshipping a mere stage in a process. For any clear-headed Smith the truth would be, not "Blessed be God" but "Blessed be the *nisus*."

Consider some other imaginative flights. To worship God as creator may be a most fitting devotion if part of the meaning of creation be that Nature and man have their sole source in the uncreated deity. But it would be almost puerile to worship the creator of the world if this world-creator were only an underling or demiurge, or, in the extreme, to worship the Devil if, as some have thought, this demiurge was really the Devil. The same would be true if, as has been imagined in the East, the world sprang from a golden egg that Brahman set upon chaos. It would be Brahman, not Ishvara, that was the genuine object of pious devotion.

Something similar might be said (although, in many ways, something that is also dissimilar) if the word "God" is not taken to describe what is ultimate but as a figurative, symbolic and imaginative way of describing the ultimate properties of existence in terms that are suited to the presumed capacity of the hearer. Such a view, of course, is very familiar and there are few theologians who would not admit that many of the ways in which God is partially described are tinged or even suffused with an anthropomorphism, a zoomorphism, an anemomorphism, an astromorphism or a pyromorphism that could not be defended literally. In a sense such a view is hypertheistic. It believes that the ultimates of existence are "beyond" the pulpit pictures of "God." In another sense, however, it is not hypertheistic; for all it is saying in the end is that God, who is the ultimate, is commonly described in language that cannot be taken literally but conveys its meaning with the grace and, it may be, with the profundity of poetry, legend and imaginative

symbolism. If it were held that the human mind, *principia quaerens*, is bound to go through this imaginative symbolic phase before its thought can reach a higher (and, indeed, the last) phase the consequence would be that our minds are driven beyond theism by the very impulse that first impels them to theism. That is what I mean by hypertheism in its most important sense. If however (and this is the commoner view) symbol, figure and imagination are only alternatives to other ways of describing the divine being, not stages in a single itinerary of devout spiritual search, "hypertheism" would seem to be a misnomer. Disputes (if there were any) between theists and hypertheists would tend to degenerate into wrangles about the legitimacy of accounting the intellect "higher" than poetry, symbol or legend (if it is the intellect that is supposed to go beyond theism) or of accepting some peculiar mystical power to reach what is "higher" (if such a power is supposed to be superior to the figurative and symbolic language in which "God" is so often described). In any case this particular contrast between theism and hypertheism is a contrast in ways of representing deity and not a contrast between the belief that God is supreme, on the one hand, and, on the other, the belief that he is but an Ishvara who is Brahman's lieutenant and creature.

Obviously an apologist for Christian theism has a more exacting brief than theists of a more general cast. He is entitled, of course, to admit that much that is said about God in the Bible and in other Christian literature is but figurative, or adapted to ears sometimes rude and almost always unscientific. Nevertheless there are limits to the elasticity of his views on such matters. Let him de-anthropomorphize the God of the Bible (supposing that the biblical accounts tally). He cannot completely veil the countenance of one that pitied men. He must admit some sort of providential arrangement, and a righteousness that has some effective resemblance to what men account righteousness in their mannish affairs. He is bound to believe in a God whose incarnation in Christ is not wholly inconceivable, and to accept a certain historicity in God's dealings with mankind, asserting that "what actually happened"

was not only an expression of deity — for anything in the world might be that — but also was something that in some special and almost straightforward sense *was* divine in a way in which no other historical events ever have been or ever could be.

Therefore it is surely essential to consider whether or not the various theistic proofs favor *Christian* theism; and if any of them favor hypertheism and are an embarrassment to Christian theists it is only candid to say so.

Let us briefly examine the most familiar of the traditional proofs, omitting the argument from motion which may fairly be called pre-scientific.

The Argument from Design — or more strictly, the Argument *to* a Designer — professes to show that the world, being a product, implies a producer, and may go on to argue that this producer must be a providence solicitous for mankind.

The goodness or badness of this argument is not our present concern. We are now asking what sort of deity would thus be proved if the proof held. The answer would be that what was proved was the existence of a supramundane deity, in a perfectly definite sense of "supramundane," who either produced the world *ex nihilo*, or by emanation from himself, or manipulated the contents of a co-eternal "receptacle" much in the way in which a potter manipulates and masters clay. Such a deity might not be ultimate; but he might be; and, if he were, there would be no difficulty in using the language of Christian theism, or, for that matter, of pulpit theism, in a straightforward way. Indeed there would be great difficulty in using it in any other way. You would have said too much to be able to afford to have any traffic with hypertheism. You would be working with *and accepting* familiar human notions about planning, succoring, fashioning and contriving and would be applying them directly to the world instead of applying them to vases or bookshelves or other artifacts.

Consider next the Cosmological Argument. This, as I suppose, is an argument from the self-insufficiency of the world to a complement which (it is held) must be divine.

The Argument from Design may be consistent with the Cosmological, and, indeed, may be a special form of it; but

only on certain assumptions. If these assumptions are abandoned there may be downright inconsistency.

If the world were a product, a mere created thing, a thing that would dissolve at once if it were not perpetually sustained, conserved and refreshed by deity, that (on certain assumptions) would of itself be a proof of the world's self-insufficiency, and the required complement would be (or at least might be) just its producer and conserver. The alleged self-insufficiency of the world, however, might be of quite another order. For instance the meaning might be that the world was a misconception, or a partial description, false when taken to be complete; or the like. If so, the required complement could not possibly be a *producer* in any intelligible sense of that term, and would not be supramundane in any straightforward sense. In particular if the Cosmological Argument were so interpreted as to require the Ontological it would be definitely inconsistent with the Argument from Design, understood as something final, that is, as theistic.

Roughly speaking, this contention is as follows: the world is said to be self-insufficient because it is not self-explanatory (whatever that may mean). Therefore a complement is required *if* existence *is* self-explanatory. The business of the Ontological Argument is just to show *a priori* that existence must be self-explanatory.

If so the brunt of the debate would fall upon the Ontological Argument; but let us pause for comment.

What is being said is that reality must be self-sufficient and that the world is not self-sufficient. If so, it is logically possible that its complement is also self-insufficient. If, as some philosophers say, God needs the world as much as (or at any rate as truly as) the world needs him, if God would be frustrated unless he "proceeded" to the world, the plain consequence would be that both God *and* the world would be severally self-insufficient, although together they would (or might) be self-sufficient.

In that case several possible theories would be defensible most of which (for sound apologetic reasons) are commonly rejected by Christian theists.

The Ontological Argument is usually stated pretty vaguely nowadays though its partisans always explain that it is very profound. That the One or the Infinite properly speaking alone is *given*, not the many or the finite; that the core of mind or thought or spirit is also the core of reality. These and similar statements usually supplant what in Anselm's hands or Descartes's was taken to be a strict piece of formal demonstration.

But whatever its precise form may be (or for that matter, whatever its imprecise fructifying impressionism) it seems clear that all expressions of the argument attempt to establish some kind of philosophical monism. And philosophical monism, if it is theistic at all, is hypertheistic and is not theism. In particular it is inconsistent in spirit and in statement with supramundane transcendence in any straightforward sense, with providential contrivance, with any and every historical incarnation which is less than completely cosmic. Absolutists, like Bradley, saw this clearly and said so. The same would be true of Parmenides or of Sankara's Advaita Vedanta.

Whatever sympathy we may have with theologians who explain that complete intellectual clarity is not to be expected in matters which must very largely be incomprehensible, we cannot have the same sympathy with a very usual tendency, namely the tendency to affirm with some complacency that theists have at their disposal a large number of arguments all of which favor theism and converge towards it so that the cumulative effect of them all is very encouraging indeed. At the risk of appearing harsh and captious and "ununderstanding" it seems necessary to point out that if the "God" who is proved or suggested by some of these arguments is inconsistent with the "God" who is proved or suggested by others the alleged consilience is not at all encouraging. Again, if only a few of these arguments, and these not the best, are reconcilable with the simpler interpretations of the Bible story, that also is not very encouraging for Christian theists.

No doubt it may plausibly be maintained that these traditional arguments are *vieux jeu* in contemporary Christian theology. That, however, should not mean that they may all be abandoned without a tear. They are always turning up,

although usually in a looser form; and looseness may be more comfortable than impressive. Supposing, then, that they have *some* importance in *some* forms, it is surely permissible to consider whether (*a*) they tend towards the same conclusion and (*b*) are so much as colorably consistent.

Let us turn, however, to certain theological ways of arguing, to methods rather than to proofs. Those I shall consider are certainly not new (which is scarcely a disadvantage) but are often held, in these present days, to be impervious to antiquation in a way the traditional "proofs" were not. We are told that they have ripeness without caducity.

Consider, for instance, the *via analogica* in theology.

In certain ways there is no denying that many theological statements can at best be analogical. If time originates in eternity it cannot originate in the ordinary sense (which is temporal). If creation has occurred, its *modus operandi* is either a complete mystery or is very vaguely analogous to any sort of empirical productivity. If the unconditioned conditions, it cannot condition in the way in which Pavlov conditioned his dogs.

Nevertheless, unless the *via analogica* is just a licence for pious vagueness it is bound to sketch the general lines on which the analogy *does* hold and to contrast the operative part of the analogy with the respects in which there can be nothing but mystery.

Thus if you say that God created the world you are saying something which cannot be wholly indefinite. You don't know how it was done. Experience gives no definite clues (even if poets and painters allege the contrary). In these and in many other ways your analogical language may be very vague indeed. On the other hand you are professing to be able to distinguish between creation, on the one hand, and, on the other, emanation or the remodelling of a pre-existent ὑποδοχή. You assert that the world is wholly dependent on God while he does not depend upon it in any way. In short the very meaning of your language is that the analogy is quite precise in certain specifiable respects.

Similarly, statements to the effect that God's care for men

and women is special and individually discriminating is a definite statement even if his love and pity differ enormously and incomprehensibly from the way in which a father pitieth his children. In such respects the belief in a Providence is either definite or meaningless.

Consider again the Incarnation. However incomprehensible this major mystery may be in many of its aspects there is much in it which is definite and quite unscreened from analogical enigmas. For Christian theists Christ and no one else was incarnated to be the God-man. That is quite different from divinity being made flesh in a race, or in a sacred bull, or in the Eastern theory according to which some Krishna invariably arose when human affairs were desperately in need of such a being.

In short you cannot sidetrack all such statements all the time, crying "'Tis but an analogy honest man"; and if you are a hypertheist and not a theist you have to discard the statements altogether. You may legitimately say "There is a non-reciprocating dependence of the world on God which may be figuratively described by the language of creation and is then less misleading than in any other figure"; but you have also to say that there was *no* creation in any sense of creation that has a definite meaning. Your figurative language may sometimes be useful and not merely pardonable; but it is definitely misleading if its esoteric sense is not clearly indicated. Therefore, I submit that it should be abandoned altogether in serious theology. A philosophical monist cannot consistently be a Christian theist although he may be a hypertheist and might perhaps be a pantheist. Clearly his views are not conciliable with incarnation, creation, providence and similar conceptions in any candid sense of language. To defend his theism a Christian theist must set about to deny philosophical monism; and he is a wiser as well as a better man if he faces that issue squarely.

The same sort of comment is even more obviously apposite in the case of the *via negativa*. That is a doctrine which has as good as no meaning except in the service of hypertheism and indeed of hypermonism. Its apex is reached when even unity

is denied to the One on the ground that a *certain* negative viz. "neither plural nor singular" is more accurate still. (It is not every negative that has this profundity but only a few negatives driven into the appropriate pen by the cunningest, and very positive, sheep-dogs.) Clearly, however, the belief that the world was produced, that there are providential arrangements, that there was an Incarnation and the like are positive and not negative statements. To deny them in any sense at all is to deny Christian and any *ultimate* theism whether or not the alternative of hypertheism remains.

The last point on which I should like to touch (and I do so with great diffidence) is the testimony of "religious experience."

If awe, reverence, piety and some sort of worship wherever the "numinous" is encountered is to be accounted "religious experience" the net is cast so widely and shimmers so elusively that the catch cannot be counted with any pretence at accuracy. In particular it would be quite useless to speculate upon the question whether the "numinous" resembles hypertheism or theism the more. Similarly it is not at all likely that experience of the numinous, in the general sense that Otto gave to that term, would have anything intelligible to say about Christian versus other forms of "theism," about the disqualification of polytheism or "mere" pantheism, about supramundane rather than immanent divinity, and the like. Indeed a reverent atheist, for instance a Buddhist, need have no occasion to deny the numinous.

Again if it be said that it is unfair to make a fuss about the most primitive forms of experience of the numinous, and that candor requires us to examine not the mere spores of the numinous but its seedlings and mature plants, it is not at all clear that the more developed forms of the numinous carry us much beyond what some have called natural piety. It is very common for Christians — although, I daresay they are very pedestrian Christians – to say that they feel "the presence" at a sunset touch, or on a starry night or in a radiant dawn. They may mean more than nature-worship. Indeed with their training it is unlikely that the celestial light they take to be interfused with and transfiguring the tints of common day has

nothing of Calvary about it. On the other hand Nature-pantheists, who are only and strictly Nature-pantheists, are surely entitled to say that they do experience awe, reverence, wonder and mystery for Nature herself, that they also are among the mystics and are not mere wand-bearers; and the like. It is simply not true that a mystic must be either a supramundane theist or a hypertheist; and it is not at all clear that he must be a theist of any intelligible sort.

If I am not very sadly mistaken, those theologians who rely largely or chiefly upon "religious experience" for the foundation of their theology are rather sharply divided according as they do or do not believe that there is what Hartley, not unfairly, called a "theopathic sense." The former party says that although some men (how many?) may be God-blind or God-deaf the others are quite definitely God-sensitive. They may misinterpret the testimony of their theopathic sense or allow it to become blunted, starved, atrophied or corrupted (perhaps by evil living). But they do have it. The latter party declares that there is no such peculiar sensitivity but that the total impact of candid experience, allowing for its finer tendrils as well as for its crasser shoots, is Godward, and that any man's denial of the fact is due to his own obtuseness. Atheists, on this view, are not sense-defectives like the blind or the deaf faithfully reporting their mutilated experience (if they are faithful). Being whole of faculty, they misreport their own religious experience.

If the second party are in the right (as I hope they are) it is very doubtful whether "religious experience" could have much that was definite to say about the sort of theological questions that have been the subject of this essay. True, it would be reasonable and perhaps necessary to maintain that the "proofs" and the "methods" with which we have principally been concerned are subordinate to something wider, more imponderable, more impressionist, more totalitarian, and that an admitted subordination of this order may make a vital difference to one's conclusions. The so-called proofs and methods (we may be told) are rather clarifications of a conviction based upon the total impact of our experience than the premises on which the conviction is based or the actual method by which it was

initially formed. Even so, however, the distinction between theism and hypertheism, or the inadequacy of "mere" pantheism, is just the point where clarification comes in. So it seems unlikely that "religious experience" could settle the point of clarity. No doubt it might be said that the total impact of "religious experience" signalled its warning against the sufficiency of "mere" pantheism or of some other effort of theological dialectic. By the same argument, however, *all* attempts at clarification are likely to be accompanied by a vague uneasiness and suspicion that something is lacking. If so hypertheism (if more than an utterly vague aspiration) would also come under the ban. ("*Neti neti*" and the "divine waste of the Godhead" may not seem to be altogether nourishing.) In short our special questions are not likely to find an answer on these lines.

If, on the other hand, it is the theopathists who are right in what they say about "religious experience" there would be a chance at least that our theopathy testifies to some pretty definite form of theism. The chance, no doubt may be rather slender. It is difficult to see how creation, for instance, could be based on theopathic evidence, even allowing that a doctrine of creaturely being may seem to be a slightly plausible quasi-intellectual reconstruction of a specific theopathic impression of utter dependence. Still, in general, it must be granted that our specific theopathic sense, if there were such a thing, might enable us to decide between theism and hypertheism, or, again, between a theism that was almost Christian and a theism or hemitheism of a different order.

Among certain contemporary theologians the claim seems to be that our "religious experience" is a matter of "I and Thou," in other words that we touch and commune with a divine being whom we sense and know and feel to be not only our succor but also our friend. Indeed we are sometimes told (surely incautiously) that "religious experience" is just the response that the risen and continuing Christ makes to the devout.

Of course it is very easy to see how a person brought up in the Christian tradition should, very naturally, put this interpretation upon *his* religious experience. What is much harder to believe is that he is giving an account of all genuine religious

experience. Is it really credible that devout atheists, and pious men in the East who reject Christianity although they have studied it, and all the saints who lived more than two thousand years ago have had this sort of communion with Christ although they did not know it or expressly denied it? And if that were credible (and I suppose many Christians do actively believe it) is it also credible that "religious experience," wherever it occurs, has to be described in these terms and in these alone if it is faithfully and clearly set down?

Suppose, however, that "religious experience," in any developed form, is always an "I and Thou" experience. What in that case could we learn about the relation between theism and hypertheism or any similar question in theological science?

So far as I can see, very little indeed. Religious men and women, according to this description of their religious experience, would be touched by and have communion with a divine being, vastly greater and stronger than they, their rock and their shield, rich in compassion, warm in understanding. How from such an experience could it legitimately be inferred that this succoring and compassionate being was Brahman and not a mere Ishvara, was supramundane, was the creator of the world, was the One and not one of many, and the like? Statements such as these (in a word, most of the bigger theological statements) would immensely extend any possible description of the "I and Thou" situation unless, of course the divine partner in this communion *told* the human partners that it was so. If he did, theology has no room for anything except revelation.

MARIUS VICTORINUS: A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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MARIUS VICTORINUS, fourth-century Rome's most distinguished professor of rhetoric, appears immediately as a definite personality to one who looks into his biography. So vividly has Augustine, in the eighth book of the Confessions, told the story of the old rhetor's conversion that he seems real flesh and blood. Yet a feeling of uneasiness soon takes possession of the investigator. The limits of Victorinus's life have not been established even in terms of broad approximation; and it is perhaps of some importance for understanding the character of the man and the times of which he is so pertinent a representative to know, for example, whether his youth and early manhood were passed in the atmosphere of Diocletian's persecutions or of Constantine's tolerant reign. I have tried, therefore, in this study to discover the means of determining at least approximately the date of his birth and of his death.

In regard to the date of Victorinus's birth, biographers may be divided into two groups — those who either do not mention the matter at all or say that nothing is known about it [1] and those who state, on the basis of conjecture, that Victorinus was born *ca.* 300 A.D.[2] There is sufficient evidence, I think, to show that the silence or the extreme caution of the former is needless and that the date suggested by the latter, though approximate, should be substantially altered.

Victorinus's life is summarized briefly by Jerome in De Viris Illustribus (101): *Victorinus, natione Afer, Romae sub Constantio principe rhetoricam docuit, et in extrema senectute, Christi se tradens fidei, scripsit adversus Arium libros . . . et commentarios in apostolum.* Victorinus's conversion, herein mentioned, took

[1] E.g., O. Bardenhewer, Gesch. d. altkirchl. Lit. III, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1912, pp. 460 f.; Schanz-Hosius VIII[2], iv, 1, 1914, pp. 149 f.; P. Wessner in P-W XIV, 1930, pp. 1840 f.; E. Benz, Marius Victorinus, Stuttgart, 1932, p. 6.

[2] P. Monceaux, Hist. litt. de l'Afrique chrétienne III, Paris, 1905, p. 374; P. de Labriolle, Hist. de la litt. lat. chrétienne, Paris, 1924, p. 346.

place in or around 355 A.D.;[3] it is this date that must serve as our point of departure.

According to Jerome's notation, Victorinus was, at the time of his conversion, *in extrema senectute*. Nor is evidence lacking to show that in this case Jerome, a younger contemporary of the great rhetorician, may be taken at his word. Augustine, in the Confessions,[4] tells at length the story of Victorinus's conversion as he had heard it from Simplicianus, who had known Victorinus intimately at Rome. Augustine's vivid account makes it clear that at the time of his conversion Victorinus was an old man who had a long and distinguished professional career behind him:

. . . quemadmodum ille doctissimus senex et omnium liberalium doctrinarum peritissimus quique philosophorum tam multa legerat et diiudicaverat, doctor tot nobilium senatorum, qui etiam ob insigne praeclari magisterii, quod

[3] The evidence for this date is analyzed and presented in full by Monceaux, op. cit. (see note 2), pp. 400 ff. It has been completely reexamined by Benz, op. cit. (see note 1), p. 7 (cf. pp. 31 ff.). The chief points are these. A certain *terminus ante quem* for Victorinus's conversion is provided by his Christian work Adversus Arium libri IV which, by internal evidence, can be placed in 359. The conversion took place somewhat before this date, however, since the Adversus Arium was preceded by at least four Christian works, namely, the extant De Generatione Divini Verbi (very shortly before the Adversus Arium), and the lost treatises on the Trinity, the Word, and the Holy Ghost. Therefore, even though Victorinus was a voluminous writer, two or three years at the least may be allowed for the production of these treatises. There are grounds for not placing the conversion earlier than reasonable allowance for the writing of these works would indicate, for both Jerome (De Viris Ill., 101; quoted in text, p. 83) and Augustine (Conf. 8, 2, 3; quoted in part in text, pp. 84–85) make Victorinus a very old man at the time of his conversion, and we know that he was still alive in 362 (Aug., Conf. 8, 5, 10; cf. text, p. 87). The soundness of this latter point is confirmed by the *terminus post quem* provided by Jerome, Chronicon, ad ann. 353 A.D.: *Victorinus rhetor et Donatus grammaticus praeceptor meus Romae insignes habentur, e quibus Victorinus etiam statuam in Foro Traiani meruit.* This marks a moment when Victorinus was at the height of his favor with Roman high (i.e. pagan) society, just as he is pictured by Augustine immediately before his conversion (Conf. 8, 2, 3; quoted in part in text, pp. 84–85). Fear of losing the favor of his friends in high place made him hesitate some little time before professing Christianity openly (Aug., Conf. 8, 2, 4 . . . *amicos enim suos reverebatur offendere, superbos daemonicolas, quorum ex culmine Babylonicae dignitatis . . . graviter ruituras in se inimicitias arbitrabatur*); that the outcome was as Victorinus foresaw is clear, even when allowances have been made for Augustine's enthusiasm (Conf. 8, 2, 4) *superbi videbant et irascebantur, dentibus suis stridebant et tabescebant.* Thus his conversion took place in the middle 350's; and Monceaux's 355 (which has the blessing of Benz) is, for an approximate date, very close indeed.

[4] 8, 2, 3–5; cf. 8, 5, 10.

cives huius mundi eximium putant, statuam Romano foro meruerat et acceperat, usque ad illam aetatem venerator idolorum sacrorumque sacrilegorum particeps, quibus tunc tota fere Romana nobilitas inflata spirabat populo Osirim et omnigenum deum monstra et Anubem latratorem, quae aliquando

'contra Neptunum et Venerem contraque Minervam'

tela tenuerant et a se victis iam Roma supplicabat, quae iste senex Victorinus tot annos ore terricrepo defensitaverat, non erubuerit esse puer Christi tui et infans fontis tui. . . .[5]

Not only is Victorinus clearly pictured here as a man far advanced in life, but the whole period is cast in the form of an elaborate antithesis which depends essentially upon his old age and the long career behind him. The first element begins early in the period with *ille doctissimus senex*, is maintained in substance for the next several lines, is picked up again definitely in *usque ad illam aetatem*, and is brought to a climax in *iste senex Victorinus tot annos ore terricrepo defensitaverat*; the second element is *non erubuerit esse puer Christi tui et infans fontis tui.* Full confidence, therefore, may be placed in Jerome's statement that Victorinus was *in extrema senectute* at the time of his conversion, that is, in about 355 A.D. But what time of life does this phrase imply?

That ninety-odd years would qualify scarcely needs confirmation: Cicero, Cato 22, *Sophocles ad summam senectutem tragoedias fecit*;[6] Apuleius, Apol. 37, *Sophocles poeta, Euripidi aemulus* (*vixit enim ad extremam senectam*), *cum igitur accusaretur a filio*

[5] Conf. 8, 2, 3.

[6] In collecting the instances presented in this paragraph, I have not attempted to go beyond passages indicated in the various lexica and the indices verborum of prose writers. Yet the yield is surprisingly small, even though I have admitted similar terms as well as *extrema senectus* itself and have allowed the preposition *ad* as well as *in* whenever it seemed not to render the expression useless for the present purpose. Cicero regularly has *senectus* in expressions of this kind, but his characteristic adjective is *summa*, which in such cases is essentially synonymous with *extrema*; this usage is noted by Nonius (401): *SVMMVM extremum . . . M. Tullius in Ortensio: vixit ad summam senectutem optima valetudine.* Other writers regularly use *extrema*. In Tacitus, *senecta* is more common than *senectus*. *Aetas*, though common in all writers I have noted, presents special difficulties. *In* (*ad*) *extrema aetate* often means "at (until) the end of one's life" without reference to the person's age (cf. Nepos, Cato 2, 4: *circiter annos octoginta, usque ad extremam aetatem ab adulescentia, rei publicae causa suscipere inimicitias non destitit*); hence only when *extrema aetas* obviously means "extreme (old) age" have I felt free to introduce it. Finally a considerable number of passages which were verbally suitable were necessarily discarded because the age of the person involved could not be closely enough determined.

suomet dementiae quasi iam per aetatem desiperet, protulisse dicitur Coloneum suam. Likewise eighty-six years: Tacitus, Ann. 5, 1, *Iulia Augusta mortem obiit, aetate extrema.* So too eighty-five and the years shortly before, as is amply shown by references to Cato: Jerome, Epist. 130, 13, *Catonem quoque . . . qui in extrema aetate Graecas litteras non erubuit censor nec desperavit senex discere*; Cicero, Res Publica 1, 1 (*Cato*) *in his undis et tempestatibus ad summam senectutem maluit iactari*; Cicero, Verr. 5, 180 (*Cato*) *usque ad summam senectutem summa cum gloria vixit.* Livia was eighty when thus mentioned by Tacitus, Ann. 4, 8: *miseratusque Augustae extremam senectam.* Seventy-eight years justified Tacitus' statement in Ann. 4, 58: (*Tiberius*) *extremam senectam compleverit.* Seventy-seven years is confirmed by Cornelius Nepos, Vita Att. 21, 1, *Tali modo cum VII et LXX annos complesset atque ad extremam senectutem non minus dignitate quam gratia fortunaque crevisset.* Tacitus (Ann. 4, 29), in writing of the year 24 A.D., speaks of *Lentulus senectutis extremae*; Lentulus was consul in 18 B.C. and, if he held that office at the lowest possible age (thirty-three years),[7] he would have been about seventy-five in 24 A.D. The lowest age in connection with which I have found phraseology of this kind is about seventy years. Cicero refers to a time when C. Marius was at that age in P. Red. ad Quir. 19: *eum tamen vidi, cum esset summa senectute*; in the Pro Sestio (50) he again uses the words *summa senectute* in referring to nearly the same point in Marius's life.

In the passages mentioned above, the following ages are represented: *ca.* ninety, eighty-six, eighty-five and somewhat less, eighty, seventy-eight, seventy-seven, seventy-five plus, *ca.* seventy. With the exception of *ca.* seventy (Cicero's reference to Marius in two passages), all are seventy-five or over. Though this evidence may not be imposing, it is sufficient to rescue one from the vacuum of pure conjecture. It would seem to indicate with probability that application of expressions of this kind to people who were below *ca.* seventy-five was unusual; it would seem to indicate clearly that application to a person below seventy was decidedly rare.

[7] Cf. Th. Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht I³, 1887, p. 574.

In the case of Victorinus, who was *in extrema senectute ca.* 355 A.D., the subtraction of the low minimum of seventy years would give 285 A.D., which is considerably below the 300 A.D. suggested by the scholars I have mentioned above.[8] If seventy-five years, which may be regarded as the more natural minimum, were subtracted, the date would fall to 280. Since there is nothing whatsoever to render a year as early as this suspect, it seems to me improbable, especially in view of the emphasis laid by later writers on his extreme old age *ca.* 355, that Victorinus was born *later* than 280. I suspect that 275 would be closer to the precise year, though the nature of the evidence obliges one to restrict his formal conclusions to those based on minima alone. On the other hand, there is reason for hesitating to place his birth *too* long before 280. We know that he was still alive in 362 (the last known date of his life).[9] Thus a year very long before 280 would make him an extremely old man indeed — perhaps a suspiciously old man — at the time of our last information concerning him. I therefore submit 280 A.D. as an approximation of the date of Victorinus's birth.

There has been as much uncertainty among scholars about the probable date of Victorinus's death as about that of his birth. Benz, the most recent writer to treat him fully, says: "Über den Tod Viktorins wissen wir so wenig wie über seine Jugend." [10] Previous scholars either speak in a similar vein or pass over the matter in silence.[11] The last reference we have concerning his life is the statement by Augustine that in 362, when Julian forbade Christians to teach literature and oratory, Victorinus quietly closed his school rather than recant; [12] in another passage, Augustine implies that by 386 Victorinus had been dead for some time.[13] It has been thought impossible to be more precise than this. It seems to me, however, that there are considerations which indicate that Victorinus's death occurred shortly after 362.

In the first place, by the very nature of things, a man *in extrema senectute* would be unlikely to live more than a few

[8] See text, p. 83; cf. note 2.
[9] See text, following paragraph.
[10] Op. cit. (see note 1), p. 7.
[11] So those mentioned in notes 1 and 2.
[12] Conf. 8, 5, 10.
[13] Conf. 8, 2, 3; cf. text, pp. 84–85.

years. Of the passages adduced above three or four may be noticed here. Livia lived six years after Tacitus (Ann. 4, 8) could speak of *Augustae extremam senectam*. Lentulus, to whom Tacitus (Ann. 4, 29) refers as being *senectutis extremae* in 24 A.D., died in the next year. Cicero, in the two passages in which he refers to Marius as being *summa senectute*, indicates a time only a few months before Marius's death. These quotations merely illustrate a point which is implicit in the phrase itself, namely, that *extrema senectus* does not long precede death. Victorinus was *in extrema senectute ca.* 355, and, even if his death should be placed immediately after the last known date of his life (362), he would still have survived his *extrema senectus* by some seven years.

Further, there is something to be gained from the well-known passage in Augustine (Conf. 8, 2, 3): . . . *commemoravi legisse me quosdam libros Platonicorum, quos Victorinus quondam rhetor urbis Romae, quem Christianum defunctum esse audieram, in latinam linguam transtulisset.* . . . These lines are generally quoted to show only that Victorinus had died some time before 386 A.D. (the dramatic date of the passage). Further information, I believe, may be found in them. There is usually a peculiar and specific implication in the phrase "he died a Christian" (*quem Christianum defunctum esse audieram*). The essential implication is that the person in question made good his salvation not long before he passed from this life. The expression combines inseparably the notions of conversion and death, and makes them immediately successive steps. Augustine could not have written as he did if any considerable period of time had intervened between Victorinus's conversion and death. This point is especially valid in Victorinus's case because immediately after his conversion he became as vociferous an exponent of the faith as he previously had been its opponent; [14] if this

[14] By 360 the converted Victorinus had produced at least five treatises (one of them in four books) on Christian subjects (cf. note 3). The De Homousio Recipiendo and the three hymns on the Trinity were written in 360 or very close to that date. It is not beside the point to note that the only other Christian works of which we have definite knowledge are the Commentaries on the Epistles of St. Paul. Extant are those on Philippians, Galatians and Ephesians; references indicate that there were some others. Although these (at least the extant ones) were written after the Adversus Arium (359),

vehement activity had extended through many years and a Christian period of real significance had arisen in his life, Augustine could not have ignored it as he did by writing *quem Christianum defunctum esse audieram*. Augustine's own career illustrates this point; one could not describe him as a Latin rhetorician who "died a Christian." In Victorinus's case, Augustine is looking back upon a man whose conversion *ca.* 355, coming as it did after a long lifetime of ardent paganism, preceded death by a comparatively short time. That interval at the longest could have been but a few years.

Finally, a statement of Jerome's, when viewed in conjunction with the points noticed above, seems to me cogent. He says, in the passage from De Viris Illustribus (101) quoted early in this paper, *Victorinus, natione Afer, Romae sub Constantio principe rhetoricam docuit.* Jerome here gives the approximate dates of Victorinus's career in Rome by introducing the phrase *sub Constantio principe*, that is, 337–361. It is clear that this phrase would have been inadequate if Victorinus's career had extended to any degree into later reigns. Constantius died in 361, and it was in the following year, under Julian, than Victorinus was obliged to close his school. It seems to me quite likely, in view of Jerome's statement, that the aged rhetor did not reopen his school when, after the death of Julian a year later, the ban against Christian teachers was lifted; if, however, the school was reopened, Jerome's phrase makes it certain that it endured only for a short time.

It was death, I think, that brought Victorinus's rhetorical career at Rome to an end shortly after 361. Jerome is, in the note quoted above, writing in the compressed style characteristic of brief biography: Victorinus's profession, the significant locale of his professional activity, and the years during which he lived to practise said profession in said locale are all accounted for in the phrase *Romae sub Constantio principe rhetoricam docuit.* Death, it seems to me, may be implied in such a statement; no other agency is general and inevitable enough to

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they need not represent the labor of years when the man in question is so voluminous a writer and in no way militate against placing the date of his death not long after 362.

be so implied. A change of locale or of profession would demand specific mention; not so death. This interpretation, strongly suggested by the notice itself, is confirmed by the points brought out in preceding paragraphs.

In view of these considerations, I feel that *ca.* 280–*ca.* 363 may reasonably be proposed as approximate dates for the life of Marius Victorinus.

A NOTE ON SOPHRONIUS OF DAMASCUS

Professor Campbell Bonner in the Harvard Theological Review, XXXV, 1–11 neatly solves a problem that has baffled me as editor as well as the author of the Loeb version of Dio Chrysostom. On page 8 he cites a passage from Sophronius describing the loud snorts of Greek worshipers in certain rites. I have a suggestion for the emendation of this passage. In line 4 ἐναγεῖς seems to be used as a derogatory substitute for ἱερᾶς as δυσσεβείας is used for εὐσεβείας in line 2. In the next line ῥινοκτυπεῖν is object of the following ποιεῖσθαι. Probably the article τὸ has been lost before it. Translate: 'Porphyry asserts that the Greeks, when they offered to the idols their consecrated sacrifices, considered it a religious salute to snort with all their might, producing the noise in question by a violent intake and forcing of the breath.' The missing τὸ has somehow attached itself at the end of ἀκούοι three lines below. Removing it, I translate: 'Hence the sacrificers enjoyed full license and made quite a point of the competition to see who would outdo the other in snorting in order that the best snorter might hold the title of First and the status of Demons' Favorite. This connotation of the sounds in question is the established one; it originated for the worship of demons, and those who utter it are without knowing it inevitably saluters of foul demons. Hence we urge those who follow this practice to take to heart its dangerous and fatal effect and to refrain from it as from a soul-destroying craze.' A transcriber has made the Greek of Sophronius seem worse than it is.

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